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**“BLASFÈMIA!” POLÍTICA I RELIGIÓ A LA REPÚBLICA D’INDONÈSIA**

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## **INTRODUCCIÓ**

Durant els anys 2016 i 2017 a Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, (conegut popularment com Ahok) es presentava a la reelecció del càrrec de governador pel 2017. Ahok, com a membre d'una doble minoria al país, al ser d'ascendència xinesa i de religió cristiana, va representar un canvi de dinàmica política, doncs pràcticament el 90% de la població es musulmana i és estrany que algú amb les seves característiques arribi a tal posició. Apart, destacava per les polítiques altament reformistes que havia estat realitzant a la ciutat, generant tant suport com crispació, per diversos sectors de la població.

Jakarta, la capital de la República d'Indonèsia, és el centre neuràlgic de pràcticament totes les decisions que es prenen al país. Allà es troben totes les seues de major importància, tant governamentals com empresarials d'Indonèsia. Per tant, el governador de Jakarta té un paper molt rellevant fent que les decisions que aquest pren acabin afectant de forma directa o colateral a un gruix poblacional i institucional molt ampli. La importància és tal, que en moltes ocasions els partits polítics utilitzen l'escenari de la capital com a trampolí per poder aspirar a posicions polítiques de major pes. La reelecció d'Ahok com a governador hagués significat la possibilitat de ser un candidat factible per les eleccions presidencials del 2019.

Després d'unes declaracions<sup>1</sup> en l'illa de Pramuka<sup>2</sup> durant la precampanya, on va dir que *“alguns ciutadans no votarien per ell perquè estaven sent enganyats per aquells que utilitzen la Carta d'Al-Maidah vers 51<sup>3</sup> amb la intenció que els ciutadans no votin per un líder no-musulmà”*, es va generar un gran revolt a les xarxes socials, derivant en protestes a Jakarta en contra d'aquest, i finalment en una acusació, judici i condemna per blasfèmia.

Tant les seves paraules, com les protestes i la judicialització del cas, van ser motiu de tens debat en l'esfera política, causant un litigi social sobre el funcionament de les institucions del país, on mitjans de comunicació i acadèmics van posar en entredit, tant les declaracions d'Ahok, com la realitat del sistema pluriconfessional en que s'organitza l'Estat.

Seguint la seva derrota electoral i posterior empresonament, el debat sobre la relació entre els grups etno-religiosos minoritaris i la majoria musulmana s'ha intensificat (Setijadi, 2017).

L'any 2012, Ahok havia accedit al càrrec presentant-se a l'administració de la ciutat com a 2n de Joko Widodo, l'actual president d'Indonèsia, però Jokowi va dimitir l'any 2014 (per obligació), ja que es postulava com a candidat a les eleccions presidencials, fent que Ahok arribés automàticament al poder tot i no haver sigut escollit de forma directa.

Un cop Ahok va governar, va realitzar diversos programes reformistes a Jakarta, com la reordenació urbanística de la llera del riu Ciliwung o polítiques enfocades a la transparència i la purga de la corrupció que patien moltes de les institucions de la regió.

Aquesta forma de governar, quan havia sigut escollit de forma indirecta, va generar que una part de la població no li reconeixes la legitimitat de les seves accions (tot i que l'emparessin les lleis de la República) i es van produir reaccions oposades entre els partidaris i detractors d'aquest.

Per tal d'abordar el cas d'Ahok en relació amb el sistema polític i religiós d'Indonèsia, s'ha realitzat un mètode d'investigació fonamentat en un anàlisi qualitatiu basat en treball de camp, la recopilació d'informació sobre

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<sup>1</sup> Consultar annexos per veure la traducció del seu discurs complet.


<sup>2</sup> Pramuka es una de les illes de la regència de Pulau Seribu, a la regió especial de la capital, Jakarta.

<sup>3</sup> ‘Vós que heu cregut, no prengueu els jueus i els cristians com a aliats. Són de fet aliats els uns dels altres. I qui sigui un aliat d'ells entre vosaltres, aleshores, és que es tracta d'un d'ells. De fet, Al·là no guia a la gent que fa/ actua malament’.

el terreny, les entrevistes en profunditat<sup>4</sup> a actors rellevants en el món acadèmic o líders religiosos com Purwo Santoso<sup>5</sup>, juntament amb l'anàlisi del discurs de diversos partits polítics indonesis durant la polèmica d'Ahok. L'estudi de cas valorarà si la sentència va ser fruit d'un ús indegut de les institucions judicial-religioses amb l'objectiu d'eliminar rivals polítics, o si pel contrari el cas va ser problemàtic per la popularitat del subjecte en concret i la sentència condemnatòria no va constituir un atac a llibertat religiosa del país.

S'ha escollit una pregunta inicial o hipòtesi centrada en l'estudi de cas:

*És la sentència condemnatòria d'Ahok per blasfèmia una vulneració de la llibertat religiosa en un Estat que es declara pluriconfessional i la filosofia del qual és "la unitat en la diversitat" (Bhinneka tunggal ika)?*



En aquest esquema, la variable independent és la sentència condemnatòria del cas Ahok, mentre que l'Estat pluriconfessional és la variable dependent que es veuria afectada. Les altres variables que apareixen serien intervinents, condicionen de forma més o menys directa la nostra variable independent, tot i que no com per dedicar-hi un capítol.

El marc teòric en el que s'encabeix aquesta recerca és “‘el mite’ de la secularització” (Griera, 2014) i “una comprensió de l'Islam polític” (Montenegro, 2004); posant de manifest que el paradigma de la secularització resulta inaplicable en països com la República d'Indonèsia, on la religió encara juga un paper fonamental en la societat i es troba en un procés de 'puixança religiosa'.

## **LA REPÚBLICA D'INDONÈSIA: CONTEXT HISTÒRIC, POLÍTIC I SOCIAL**

La proclamació d'independència de Sukarno i la creació de la República Unitària d'Indonèsia l'any 1945 marcarà el tret de sortida per la construcció de l'Estat Indonès tal i com el coneixem a dia d'avui. El mateix any de la declaració, s'acaba optant per un règim democràtic presidencialista, que mentre va estar vigent es va caracteritzar per una rotació de gabinets (Feith, 1962).

<sup>4</sup> Per tal de realitzar-les s'ha utilitzat el mètode de entrevista semiestructurada, en les quals he realitzat un guió de 5 preguntes bàsiques iguals per tots els agents, alternades amb preguntes espontànies, intentant deixar espais perquè l'entrevistat expressi els seus punts de vista.

<sup>5</sup> El Dr. Purwo Santoso és rector de La universitat Nahdlatul Ulama a Yogyakarta; cap de departament i professor de Política i Govern de FISIPOL UGM.

La primera convocatòria d'eleccions l'any 1955, no va aportar estabilitat política. Es van produir conflictes entorn a la redacció de la constitució del país, ja que des del Islam Polític representat per el partit Masyumi s'apostava perquè s'apliqués la Carta de Medina enlloc del Pancasila<sup>6</sup> (Formichi, 2004).

Formulat per Sukarno el 1945, el Pancasila pretenia alleujar les tensions religioses i promoure el pluralisme, ja que la pràctica religiosa específica és de lliure elecció per a l'individu. Aquesta filosofia Estatal ha servit de balança en cadascun dels períodes polítics del país, sent fortament promoguda durant el règim del *New Order* fins a dia d'avui.

Paral·lelament a la redacció de la constitució, van haver rebel·lions en diversos territoris (com Aceh)<sup>7</sup> així que es va decidir virar cap a l'autoritarisme, aplicant, l'any 1959, un decret presidencial que atorgava un poder absolut a Sukarno.

Des d'aquest moment, el seu mandat es va basar en una concentració de poder en mans del president conegut com a "democràcia guiada", amb una base ideològica marcadament nacionalista (Vickers, 2005; Legge, 1973). Aquesta pretensió de concentració de poders tenia com a objectiu final el control del PKI<sup>8</sup> (Partit Comunista Indonesi), l'exèrcit i els nacionalistes, els pilars que el mantenien en el poder.

L'any 1965 es produeix un cop d'Estat fallit, que ràpidament s'atribueix al PKI. Això debilita Sukarno, i entrega el poder a l'exèrcit, dirigit en aquell moment per el general Suharto, en un decret anomenat 'Supersemar' (1966).

Suharto acabarà sent proclamat president l'any 1968, mantenint-se al poder fins l'any 1998.

Mentre Sukarno va arribar al poder i posteriorment el va mantenir, gràcies al suport de nacionalistes, comunistes i a organitzacions vinculades a l'Islam, Suharto ho va fer comptant amb el suport de l'exèrcit i dels líders islamistes, els quals es varen encarregar l'eliminar als partidaris del PKI.

Un cop els islamistes amenaçaren l'hegemonia de Suharto, aquest els va apartar del poder, substituint-los pel seu propi partit, el Golkar, amb el qual el mantindrà com a cap del govern Indonesi durant tres dècades. La premsa i la societat civil es van veure limitades en l'exercici de les seves llibertats (Lane, 2019).

Només eren permesos tres partits polítics seleccionats per Suharto: el PPP ('*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*'), consistent en els partits polítics musulmans, el PDI ('*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*'), format per els nacionalistes i el Golkar ('*Golongan Karya*'), el partit del règim. En qualsevol cas, l'aparell repressiu podia intervenir en la determinació dels polítics i les seves accions.

Per tant, es pot considerar que la instrumentalització de l'Islam ha estat un element imprescindible per a la consecució dels equilibris de poder necessaris de govern, i actualment segueix sent així, com mostra per exemple que Jokowi<sup>9</sup> hagi escollit en la 2a candidatura a un líder islàmic com Ma'ruf Amin<sup>10</sup>.

Aquesta etapa, coneguda com "*New Order*", va ser fortament anticomunista, a diferència de l'etapa de Sukarno. No oblidem que aquest període coincideix amb la Guerra Freda, i es creu que els EUA (que en aquells moments

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<sup>6</sup> Pancasila prové de dos paraules javaneses: 'Panca' que vol dir 'cinc', i 'Sila' que vol dir principis. Per tant, Pancasila es refereix als '5 principis'. Aquests són: 'creença en un únic Déu', 'respecte entre els pobles', 'unitat d'Indonèsia', 'deliberació entre representants' i 'consens i justícia social'. Es tracta d'una fórmula de principis deliberadament amplis i genèrics (Montobbio, 2009; Ricart Angulo, 2010).

<sup>7</sup> Aceh es una regió del nord de Sumatra que ha seguit apostant fins a dia d'avui per aplicar la llei Sharia en el seu territori.

<sup>8</sup> Partit Comunista Indonesi, era el partit més arrelat entre els ciutadans indonesis i el segon partit comunista amb més afiliats fora de la URSS. (Lane, 2007; Ricart, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Joko Widodo, conegut popularment com a 'Jokowi' és el 7è president d'Indonèsia, i el primer provinent d'un origen 'humil'. Va fer-se popular degut a les reformes realitzades quan va arribar a alcalde de Surakarta (la seva ciutat natal) l'any 2009, al cap de poc arribat a governador de Jakarta i finalment president d'Indonèsia (actualment en segon mandat).

<sup>10</sup> Ma'ruf Amin, actual vicepresident d'Indonèsia ha sigut líder suprem de Nahdlatul Ulama i president de MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), organització que comprèn el cos superior de líders clericals musulmans. Ma'ruf va testificar en contra d'Ahok en el seu judici.

es trobava immers en la guerra del Vietnam (1955-1975)), va influir en el control i contenció del PKI per tal d'evitar l'expansió del comunisme en les regions del sud-est asiàtic (Loh Kok Wah, F & Öjendal, J., 2005).

En restringir la participació política i fixar el sistema electoral, el nou govern va ordenar reduir la MPR (Assemblea Consultiva Popular) i el DPR (Parlament), deixant-ho en poc més que uns mecanismes de l'executiu. El govern de Suharto va justificar aquesta restricció política com a necessària per a l'estabilitat, requisit previ al desenvolupament econòmic.

Durant el període de Suharto, es van realitzar atacs cap als indonesis d'origen xinès, degut a un ressentiment dels nadius provinent de l'època colonial, però que es va justificar tot relacionant als indonesis de descendència xinesa amb la República Popular de Xina (comunista). Es va cremar la ambaixada de Xina a Jakarta, i es van establir lleis anti-xineses, com ara prohibir les escoles de xinès, els cartells amb lletres xines o obligar als indonesis d'origen xinès a canviar els seus noms per 'noms indonesis' (Sutanto, 2002).

Es racionalitzaven ideologies que donaven suport a la corrupció, incloent la negació de la responsabilitat, la ponderació social i una crida a lleialtats més elevades. Això va ser fonamental per les explicacions entorn els baixos salaris de la funció pública, la responsabilitat deficient i el lideratge corrupte als més alts nivells del govern (Budiman, A; Roan, A & Callan, V., 2012).

Després d'haver governat el país durant tres dècades, el president semblava totpoderós i la seva autoritat indiscutible, aixecant el país, en una etapa generacional, fins a convertir-lo en una nova economia industrialitzada (Eklöf, S., 1999).

Però l'any 1997 una greu recessió econòmica sacseja a l'Àsia, afectant de ple al país i generant una crisi de credibilitat social cap el seu govern. Després de revoltes<sup>11</sup> arreu del país, Suharto renuncia a la presidència en favor del seu vicepresident, Habibie.

Aquest ha estat un punt d'inflexió en la història indonèsia. La caiguda de Suharto ha obligat a realitzar canvis en les estructures del país, començant per obrir el sistema de partits, presentant-se fins a 48 d'ells a les eleccions de 1999, alguns dels quals amb suports d'organitzacions religioses, i sent aquest, l'inici de l'etapa política que ha perdurat pràcticament fins a data d'avui, coneguda com a '*Reformasi*'.

Habibie va ser succeït per Abdurrahman Wahid, líder de Nahdlatul Ulama, que al cap de dos anys va ser cessat i substituït per Megawati Sukarnoputri (la filla de Sukarno i líder del PDI-P).

3 anys més tard, al acabar Megawati la legislatura, va convocar eleccions i va ser substituïda per la candidatura personalista (al crear el seu propi partit) de Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), qui va esdevenir president durant 10 anys. Durant aquest període va realitzar reformes en les estructures socials del país fins a acabar esquitxat per la corrupció durant el seu segon mandat. Actualment i des de 2014, el president del país es Joko Widodo.

Un dels principis fundacionals de la República d'Indonèsia és la unitat. Tant és així que queda recollit en el tercer principi del Pancasila, que clama '*Persatuan Indonesia*' (la unitat d'Indonèsia) i en el lema nacional '*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*' (unió en la diversitat).

Aquests principis, són la base que sustenta el sistema polític i social i l'Estat pluriconfessional; els dos pilars que han permès l'aparició d'un líder polític amb les característiques d'Ahok.

*"El Pancasila només dona el principi, però com situem la religió en la política no està clar. Per aquesta raó existeix el ministeri d'affers religiosos (...) un llegat de l'època colonial que l'Estat utilitza per controlar la pràctica religiosa"*. Dr. Hakimul Ikhwan<sup>12</sup>, octubre de 2019.

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<sup>11</sup> Les revoltes succeïdes a les grans ciutats van tenir també com a víctimes les minories xineses, de les quals van morir centenars, molts comerços van ser incendiats i es van produir violacions a dones xineses.

<sup>12</sup> El Dr. Hakimul Ikhwan és Sociòleg, investigador i professor al PSKK (Center of Population and Policy studies), UGM.

Actualment, alguns activistes musulmans responsabilitzen el Pancasila del nombre creixent de conversions al cristianisme i consideren que no dona a l'Islam un lloc prou rellevant en la ideologia nacional indonèsia (Suhadi, 2014).

## **POLÍTICA I RELIGIÓ A LA REPÚBLICA D'INDONÈSIA**

Política i la religió són dos elements indubtablement relacionats, com mostra la fractura que estableix la religió en l'organització de partits polítics, el poder de les organitzacions religioses (on el seu discurs influeix profundament en el sistema polític) o detalls com el document nacional d'identificació, la KTP (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk*) on apareix la afiliació religiosa dels ciutadans<sup>13</sup>.

D'altra banda, com s'ha esmentat anteriorment, la instrumentalització de l'Islam és un element fonamental en l'equilibri de poders al país, necessari per poder disposar un nombre suficient de suports, ja que actualment es podria considerar com l'únic element cohesionador majoritari suficientment arrelat en la societat indonèsia, com podria haver sigut el PKI en temps de Sukarno.

*“(La religió) és inherent en la política indonèsia. (...) Tots els polítics o tothom que sap de política fa això. Si ells utilitzen la religió és més fàcil arribar al poder”.* Dr. Purwo Santoso, novembre de 2019.

Si ens centrem en el nivell polític, hi ha 9 partits amb representació nacional, tot i que el nombre de partits constituïts es major, però es necessita un mínim del 3% del total de vots per obtenir representació en el parlament del país (DPR-RI). La majoria d'aquests partits tenen el seu origen en les organitzacions de masses prèvies a la democratització del país (Shiraishi, 1990). Per exemple, 'Masyumi Partai' provenia de les organitzacions islàmiques (de les quals parlaré més endavant) Muhammadiyah i Nahdlatul Ulama (Madinier, 2015) i 'Partai Sarekat Islam' de la Unió Islàmica i la Unió de Comerç Islàmica (von der Mehden, 2009), el qual encara existeix a dia d'avui, sota el nom Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).

Actualment, aquest vincle entre organitzacions religioses i partits polítics encara és present, com s'ha mostrat en les eleccions del 2014 o les de 2019, on els partits PKB i PAN tenen representació gràcies a la relació amb NU i Muhammadiyah respectivament. Aquestes xarxes també funcionen per a d'altres partits polítics, encara que possiblement la relació no sigui tan forta i directa (Tomsa, 2010).

Tot i que en els últims 20 anys els partits polítics han fet progressos per arrelar i institucionalitzar-se en la societat (Mietzner, 2013) no es pot passar per alt que la connexió entre política i societat és molt petita; es pot considerar que la política pertany a les elits del país majoritàriament, els partits polítics són instruments d'aquestes elits (Tapsell, 2017; Lane, 2019).

*“El que tenim no són unes eleccions per escollir president, això (referint-se a les eleccions del 2019), és una celebració de la dominació per part de les elits, i els partits polítics són només un escenari”.* Dr. Purwo Santoso, novembre de 2019.

Per citar exemples, el partit NasDem és propietat d'un magnat dels mitjans de comunicació, o partits com Gerindra o Demokrat són personalistes, es a dir, van ser creats i giren entorn a la imatge d'un polític més que en una ideologia pròpia.

En la classificació ideològica dels partits polítics, s'hauria utilitzat tradicionalment l'obra de Geertz, però actualment aquests conceptes pràcticament ja no s'utilitzen.

L'eix esquerra-dreta d'ordenació dels partits en les societats europees no és efectiu en la seva aplicació a la República d'Indonèsia, ja que no tenen un programa polític definit que permeti distingir-los ideològicament

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<sup>13</sup> Aquesta identificació religiosa en la KTP ha sigut altament debatuda, degut en primer lloc a la manca de privacitat de que tothom pugui conèixer la teva afiliació religiosa i en segon lloc que només hi hagin acceptades les 6 religions majoritàries.

(Ricart Angulo, 2010). Es tractaria d'una dicotomia entre nacionalistes (partits més aviat seculars) i islamistes (fortament lligats a organitzacions religioses).

Les dues organitzacions socioreligioses més grans d'Indonèsia són: Muhammadiyah i Nahdlatul Ulama.

Muhammadiyah és una organització que pretén reviuire i transmetre la puresa de la doctrina de l'Islam a la vida de la moderna societat indonèsia mitjançant l'educació, esvaint tot tipus de cultures i rituals de la comunitat que no estan d'acord amb l'Alcorà i la Sunnah, mentre que Nahdlatul Ulama, és un moviment islàmic que té una alta tolerància per defensar la tradició cultural de la societat indonèsia des de segles enrere. Els seguidors de Muhammadiyah són àmpliament acceptats en entorns urbans, mentre que els seguidors de Nahdlatul Ulama són d'àmbit més rural. Muhammadiyah s'adreça als d'alt nivell educatiu receptius a la transformació cultural, Nahdlatul Ulama abraça una societat més àmplia per la seva doctrina tolerant i pacífica.

Aquestes dues organitzacions, que financen centres educatius com escoles o universitats, es troben fortament arrelades en la societat musulmana del país i les seves consideracions tenen un pes molt important en les orientacions polítiques, tant a nivell local com estatal (Ishomuddin, 2014).

Davant del progrés del discurs democràtic institucional en la *Reformasi* Indonèsia, els moviments de l'Islam Polític Indonesi (Front Pembela Islam - FPI, Hizbut Tahrir Indonèsia -HTI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia -MUI, Fòrum Umat Islam – FUI, etc.) han estat obligats a reajustar les seves estratègies per assegurar-se l'adaptació al nou panorama polític. Tot i que inicialment concebien la democràcia com a nociva i incompatible amb la fe islàmica, els moviments polítics islamistes han adoptat gradualment diverses estratègies que els permeten entrar a l'àmbit democràtic i ser reconeguts com a actors legítims dins d'ella. Han mostrat un compliment més acceptat de les normes democràtiques i han fet diversos ajustaments en la seva posició ideològica, especialment pel que fa referència a les relacions entre l'Islam, democràcia, pluralisme i l'Estat Nació, per tal de poder justificar estratègies (Alif Alvian, 2019).

Aquesta interrelació entre organitzacions civils i sistema polític fa que el discurs i opinió de les organitzacions sigui un mecanisme important de pressió en la presa de decisions tant dels partits polítics com dels tribunals que regulen i limiten les accions dels dos, com per exemple, en el discurs emprat per organitzacions com Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), l'elit clerical islàmica del país o les realitzades per polítics de rellevància, que insten la condemna a Ahok:

*“Qui ha estat provat culpable ha de rebre un càstig. Per tant, Ahok s'ha de processar legalment, no deixeu que Ahok sigui immune a la llei”*. Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, expresident d'Indonèsia i líder del partit Demokrat, novembre de 2016, (KompasTv).

*“La declaració d'Ahok es classifica en insultar l'Alcorà i insultar a l'Ulama. (...) El govern està obligat a prevenir qualsevol blasfèmia de la religió alcorànica i islàmica, per tant, en no deixar-ho en llibertat”*. Tengku Zulkarnain, Ustad a Riau i membre de la cúpula de MUI, octubre de 2016, (TvOneNews).

Tot i que l'Islam té un pes molt important en la política indonèsia al tractar-se del país del món amb més musulmans (225 milions, el 87% de la població), no podem deixar de banda el pes que tenen les altres religions en la societat Indonèsia. A Bali, el motor turístic del país, el 83% de la població practica l'hinduisme (quan només el 1,3% del total de la població Indonèsia practica aquesta religió), fet que genera tensions amb el govern central (Nordhold, 2007). En algunes ocasions, aquestes diferències poden derivar en moviments secessionistes, com es el cas de Timor-Leste, o Papua (de majoria cristiana) reflectint així la pèrdua de legitimitat i poca presència de l'Estat en aquestes àrees (Mas'udi, 2019).

Un altre factor a tenir en compte es l'etnicitat, ja que hi ha 633 ètnies reconegudes i es parlen més de 300 llengües. Això explica que el lema nacional sigui 'unitat en la diversitat'<sup>14</sup>. També ha sigut molts cops causant de conflictes, com podria ser el conflicte a Kalimantan entre Dayaks i Maduresos (Koenig, 2012; Ayami, 2018).

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<sup>14</sup> 'Bhinneka tunggal ika' (la unitat en la diversitat) és el lema nacional del país i apareix en els peus de l'escut de la república.



S'ha de valorar que moltes ètnies han adoptat una religió de forma majoritària, com els Javanesos l'islam, els Batak Karo el protestantisme, o els Balinesos l'hinduisme.

La relació entre el govern central i els processos de descentralització realitzats durant la '*Reformasi*' generen dubtes sobre com afectarà la confluència entre minories i majories al país, però està clar que el triangle entre ètnia-religió-política no pot ser ignorat per generar polítiques efectives que mantinguin els interessos territorials satisfets.

## **EL CAS D'AHOK**

La representació de les comunitats ètniques minoritàries és un problema agut en molts països de l'est i el sud-est asiàtic. A Indonèsia, de majoria musulmana, l'auge del governador de Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, conegut com "Ahok" va ser un fenomen sorprenent, donat la seva minoria ètnica i religiosa com a cristià de descendència xinesa. Encara més sorprenent va ser el seu èxit inicial com a polític, malgrat emprar un controvertit estil de comunicació on amonestava públicament a buròcrates, contrastant amb les normes culturals vigents.

Ahok arriba a governador l'any 2014, després que Jokowi (amb qui s'havia presentat en una candidatura conjunta l'any 2012) es presentés a la presidència del país, i Ahok, fins el moment vice-governador assumís les responsabilitats.

Durant la seva etapa com a governador de Jakarta va realitzar accions populars, com l'obertura d'espais públics i la lluita contra la corrupció, així com d'altres més polèmiques, com la destrucció dels guetos que hi havia en el marginal del riu Ciliwung (amb la corresponent neteja del riu i la reubicació de 16.000 famílies que vivien allà), per tal de evitar les constants inundacions que pateix la ciutat, juntament amb la creació d'un mur gegant a la badia de Jakarta per evitar que la part nord de la ciutat quedi coberta per el mar (tot i que la ciutat segueix enfonsant-se any rere any).

L'any 2016, quan Ahok es presentava a la reelecció, va realitzar un discurs a la regència de Seribu on va dir als votants que no havien de ser enganyats pels líders religiosos que utilitzen el vers Al'Maidah 51, en relació a l'afirmació que els musulmans no haurien de ser dirigits per no musulmans. Posteriorment, el seu discurs va ser editat per Buni Yani<sup>15</sup>, un professor d'universitat i líder religiós que es considera el primer instigador de les protestes contra Ahok. La versió editada del discurs d'Ahok va circular per les xarxes socials com la pólvora, fent que diverses organitzacions islamistes s'indignessin davant el comentari del governador i realitzessin protestes massives els següents dies, que s'acabarien anomenant el moviment 212<sup>16</sup>.

*"La religió va ser només un dels factors (de les protestes). (...) Alguns dels grups musulmans que van organitzar els moviments de protesta estaven finançats per grups xinesos com el de Tomy Winata".* Prof. Joash Tapiheru<sup>17</sup>, novembre de 2019.

La pressió de les protestes van fer que tant Jokowi com el seu vicepresident, Jusuf Kalla<sup>18</sup> diguessin que el cas d'Ahok seria investigat per el tribunal del districte nord de Jakarta. La fiscalia va acusar Ahok de blasfèmia<sup>19</sup> (codi penal, article 156a) i difamació a clergues (article 156). Un cop acabades les eleccions de la ciutat, amb

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<sup>15</sup> Buni Yani també va acabar sent condemnat a 1 any i mig de presó per instigar un discurs d'odi.

<sup>16</sup> El nom prové de la manifestació multitudinària del 2 de desembre de 2016

<sup>17</sup> Prof. Joash Tapiheru: Estudiant de recerca de postgrau, professor al departament de PolGov i investigador al Centre d'Estudis de Política i Governança, FISIPOL UGM.

<sup>18</sup> Jusuf Kalla, va ser vicepresident durant el primer govern de Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004 i 2009) i va tornar a ser-ho amb Joko Widodo (2014-2019). També ha sigut ministre en els dos governs anteriors a SBY.

<sup>19</sup> El codi penal indonesi estableix que "aquells que deliberadament, en públic, expressen hostilitat, odi o menyspreu contra les religions i els que deshonrin a una religió seran condemnats a una pena màxima de 5 anys".

la derrota d'Ahok, el tribunal va emetre sentència, condemnant a Ahok per blasfèmia a 2 anys de presó, una pena més forta de la que demanava inicialment el fiscal<sup>20</sup>.

Ahok va ser un cas mediàtic degut a la seva posició política, però les condemnes per blasfèmia no han fet més que augmentar en els últims anys. Segons dades de l'Institut Setara de Jakarta, entre 1965 i 2017 es van produir 97 casos de blasfèmia, 88 dels quals des de 1998 i 22 des que Jokowi és president, tot i que al 2020 ja haurien arribat a 30 els casos. Segons Amnistia Internacional, entre 2005 i 2014 s'haurien produït 106 condemnes per blasfèmia.

A més, el nombre de denúncies per blasfèmia s'ha multiplicat posteriorment a la condemna d'Ahok degut a l'efecte crida. La gran majoria d'aquests casos han sigut per ofenses a l'Islam, en primer lloc perquè és la religió majoritària i per tant, en la que hi ha més possibilitats de casos, però per altra banda, mostra discriminació cap a minories religioses, donant l'aparença de que els tribunals d'afers religiosos tenen la funció instrumental d'acabar amb aquells que qüestionen l'Islam.

Els recents casos de blasfèmia, també mostren com la política juga un paper important en la seva conformació. Moltes de les persones que han denunciat aquests delictes estan afiliades a partits polítics que competeixen a les properes eleccions, tal i com expliquen els diversos entrevistats.

Segons Rumadi Ahmad, president de l'Institut de Recerca Humana de Nahdlatul Ulama (*Lakpesdam NU*), els darrers 40 anys, els casos de blasfèmia a Indonèsia tenen el mateix patró. Molts han començat amb manifestacions massives i la llei s'ha aplicat sota el precepte de la molèstia pública que produeix aquesta acció de masses.

Rumadi, ha realitzat investigacions sobre casos de blasfèmia a Indonèsia a partir del cas HB Jassin el 1968 (Un famós escriptor que va publicar un relat on hi havia una imatge inapropiada d'Allah i on es criticava a Sukarno), i ha dit que gairebé no hi ha casos de difamació que no impliquessin les masses: *“La definició de blasfèmia no està clara. Com un article sobre cautxú que pot ser imposat a qualsevol, fins i tot si aquesta persona no té intenció de dur a terme blasfèmia. Les manifestacions i les accions són vistes com a molèsties públiques de manera que es diu que les accions de la persona molesten l'ordre públic”*. Rumadi Ahmad, novembre de 2016 (a BBC News: Budiaman 2016)<sup>21</sup>.

Els mateixos grups d'interès i 'mass media', a través "lobbys" de pressió en mitjans comunicatius i les protestes de grups com 212, acaben pressionant als tribunals religiosos i aquests emeten una sentència condemnatòria que afecta directament a Ahok com a governador i indirectament sobre la pluralitat religiosa al país.

*“La religió en aquell moment era l'única manera possible d'afrontar Ahok políticament en lloc de tecnocràticament, per la qual cosa utilitzen la religió per participar contra Ahok”*. Prof. Joash Tapiheru, novembre de 2019.

Alguns dels últims casos mediàtics relacionats amb la llei de blasfèmia han sigut el de l'estudiant cristià de 22 anys Agung Kurnia Ritonga (2018), acusat de blasfèmia per una mesquita local i condemnat a 18 mesos de presó per burlar-se per Instagram d'una foto on 3 joves cremen la bandera d'un grup militant prohibit, realitzant comentaris ofensius contra l'Islam o el de Meiliana (2018), una ciutadana d'origen xinès i budista acusada de blasfèmia per un alt càrrec de la policia i condemnada a 18 mesos de presó, arrestada l'any 2016 després de demanar que baixessin el volum dels altaveus de la mesquita de davant de casa seva.

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<sup>20</sup> Dos dies després que Ahok fos condemnat, tres dels cinc jutges en el cas d'Ahok van anunciar la seva promoció: Abdul Rosyad es va convertir en un jutge del Tribunal Superior de Palu, Dwiarso Budi Santiarto va ser promogut a jutge de l'Audiència Superior al Tribunal Superior de Denpasar, i Jupriyadi es va convertir en president del Tribunal de districte a Bandung. (JakartaGlobe, 11 de maig 2017).

<sup>21</sup> Consultar annexos: Budiaman., W. (2016). *“Inilah kasus-kasus penistaan agama di Indonesia, 'subjektif' dan ada tekanan massa”*.

## **RESULTATS DE LA INVESTIGACIÓ**

Arribats a aquest punt, ens hauríem de plantejar quin ha estat l'efecte de la variable independent (la sentència condemnatòria a Ahok) sobre la dependent (l'Estat pluriconfessional).

De l'anàlisi de les entrevistes a la Universitat Gadjah Mada, es pot extreure que els diversos entrevistats, tot i pertànyer a diverses branques de les Ciències Socials, comparteixen una opinió similar en que la condemna d'Ahok ve donada per aquells actors polítics que han volgut instrumentalitzar la religió per acabar amb un rival polític, provocant així una violació de la llibertat religiosa del país.

*"(La condemna d'Ahok) és part de la politització de la religió, però de nou, suposa el reflexe d'un sistema inacabat que no posa de forma clara la relació entre Estat i Religió".* Dr Hakihul Ikhwan, octubre de 2019.

De l'anàlisi de discurs dels principals partits polítics<sup>22</sup>, s'extreu en la major part dels casos que hi ha separació de poders, tots els ciutadans són iguals davant la llei i es té que deixar que el poder judicial actuï per el seu compte. El Golkar, en certa manera, defensa la posició d'Ahok, i en el cas de Gerindra<sup>23</sup>, considera que Ahok clarament ha comès blasfèmia.

*"L'únic que interpreta l'Alcorà correctament, legalment, i perfectament són Al·là i els seus missatgers. A la literatura, hi ha un procés "creatiu" que vol dir que la persona que més entén sobre el text, és la persona que ha creat aquest text. De manera que només és Ahok qui sap i entén perfectament el que va dir a la gent de Seribu, i Ahok va dir que no volia dir blasfèmia".* Nusron Wahid, membre de Golkar, octubre de 2016, (TvOneNews).

*"No necessitem fer servir cap professor per acabar aquest cas, perquè aquest cas és senzill. Les frases que va dir Ahok sobre Al-maidah són clarament una blasfèmia, i també ha demanat disculpes i la persona que es disculpa vol dir que admet el seu error".* Fadli Zon, vicepresident de Gerindra, octubre de 2016, (TvOneNews).

El discurs analitzat de Majelis Ulama Indonesia, surt en defensa de la Carta d'Al-Maidah i que no es puguin escollir líders no-musulmans; considera que Ahok ha comès una ofensa a l'Islam i insta a tots els ciutadans a que, si s'assabenten que algú ha comès blasfèmia, sigui denunciat a les autoritats.

*"El vers 51 de Al-Maidah, explícitament és una prohibició de triar jueus i cristians com a líders, o prohibir que els no musulmans es converteixin en un líder. Ulama ha de dir als musulmans que l'elecció d'un líder musulmà és obligatòria. Tots els musulmans estan obligats a creure la veritat de Surah al-Maidah 51 com a guia per triar els líders".*

*"En afirmar que el contingut del Surat al Maidah 51 que conté la prohibició de triar jueus i cristians per ser líders és una mentida, la llei és 'haram' i es declara com a blasfèmia contra la religió".* Tengku Zulkarnain, Ustad a Riau i membre de la cúpula de MUI, octubre de 2016, (TvOneNews).

A nivell directe, l'efecte de la variable independent sobre la dependent ha estat el dany a la reputació d'Indonèsia com a país divers i tolerant. La condemna d'Ahok va ser criticada per diverses organitzacions internacionals al·legant suposades violacions dels drets humans. Amnistia Internacional ha afirmat que la sentència serà perjudicial per la reputació d'Indonèsia com a país tolerant; el Consell de Drets Humans de les Nacions Unides ha manifestat preocupació per la pena de presó per blasfemar, demanant que es revisi l'article de blasfèmia que es troba en el dret penal indonesi i la delegació de la Unió Europea a Indonèsia ha demanat que el país continuï mantenint la tradició de tolerància i pluralisme per la qual havia sigut admirada arreu del món.

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<sup>22</sup> La idea inicial era fer entrevistes en profunditat a representats dels diversos partits, però degut a problemes burocràtics (i a cert bloqueig passiu per part de les centrals dels partits a Jakarta), he tingut que basar-me únicament en els discursos de posicionament realitzats durant el cas d'Ahok i penjats a la xarxa, els quals s'han traduït del indonesi al català. Consultar annexos d'entrevistes per veure les traduccions completes.

<sup>23</sup> Gerindra va ser el partit amb el que es va presentar Ahok per governar a Jakarta. Va marxar del partit quan Gerindra es va oposar a les lleis que havien permès que polítics com Ahok o Jokowi arribessin al poder.

Les protestes massives han permès també agrupar les branques Islamistes més tradicionalistes del país en un mateix moviment<sup>24</sup>, que agrupa a salafistes, tradicionalistes, la branca més conservadora de Nahdlatul Ulama, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia<sup>25</sup> i altres, donant així major rellevància i influència als moviments de l'Islam Polític en el funcionament del país.

Actualment, s'ha posat de rellevància que a dia d'avui, l'element més arrelat de forma majoritària en la població Indonèsia és l'Islam, i aquest té una forta capacitat de mobilitzar la població.

## **CONCLUSIÓ**

L'augment del nombre de casos de blasfèmia s'ha produït en un context de pietat creixent en la societat indonèsia.

Al mateix temps, els grups conservadors musulmans no poden organitzar-se com una força política coherent. Els polítics veuen aquest fet com una oportunitat per a mobilitzar els musulmans que poden donar suport als seus interessos polítics i fer ús de la llei de la blasfèmia és una de les estratègies que fan servir per a la mobilització dels musulmans més conservadors, ja sigui per a exaltar sentiments religiosos o per a perseguir els seus oponents polítics.

Per tant, l'Islam segueix tenint el mateix rol polític que ja tenia en temps de Sukarno: ser el pèndul que permet els equilibris de poder entre les forces dominants, però això sí, tenint major pes a dia d'avui que en etapes anteriors.

La hipòtesi inicial que es plantejava a l'inici de la recerca, ha quedat confirmada. El cas d'Ahok ha estat un detonant que ha afectat les llibertats religioses al país i ha posat de manifest que, com a mínim en aquest cas, hi ha hagut una instrumentalització de la religió amb finalitats polítiques.

La pluralitat del país s'ha vist qüestionada degut a que el govern, partits polítics, organitzacions religioses i societat civil s'han posicionat en la judicialització de l'exgovernador de Jakarta.

La República d'Indonèsia, es trobaria immersa en un paradoxa, on per una banda hi hauria un procés de sacralització, ja que el pes de les organitzacions islàmiques en les institucions es cada cop més gran i monopolista, i per una altra, tal i com diu Berger, un canvi de la religió com un fet donat per descomptat cap a un pluralisme religiós que en les societats modernes hauria donat pas a una 'puixança religiosa' que podria estar produint un gir cap al fonamentalisme.

En aquestes circumstàncies, la població indonèsia d'origen xinès, ha estat víctima de forma tradicional de la discriminació ètnica a Indonèsia, degut al cas d'Ahok i el gir cap al fonamentalisme, la discriminació hauria augmentat, ja que segons enquestes recents, un 30% dels musulmans indonesis tindrien visions fortament intolerants cap a no-musulmans i encara més profundes en relació als compatriotes d'origen xinès (Mietzner i Muhtadi, 2019). És a dir, el cas d'Ahok ha reforçat l'antic discurs en contra dels no *pribumi* (aquells que no són nadius), accentuant les distincions ètniques i religioses dels diversos grups que conformen el país.

*“Jo no estic en la política, i no m'importa massa aquesta, perquè primer de tot soc un xinès indonesi, budista i a més no tinc cap connexió en la política (...) quan tu esdevenís polític o algú amb gran poder (em refereixo a l'Estat, no en una companyia), tu tens que ser musulmà, es la primera regla no parlada o escrita, especialment des del cas d'Ahok”.* Kenzy Dario<sup>26</sup>, novembre de 2019.

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<sup>24</sup> Tot i que en un començament la agrupació es va realitzar en el moviment de 212, aquesta ha anat canviant de nom en els últims 3 anys.

<sup>25</sup> Una organització pan-islamista internacional que vol restablir un Califat sota la llei Xaria a tots els països musulmans.

<sup>26</sup> Kenzy Dario és un estudiant d'Informàtica a la Universitat Gadjah Mada.

El cas d'Ahok també ha demostrat el pes de la ciutadania i la importància de la seva opinió, ja sigui a nivell de plataformes i xarxes socials, on Jakarta (la ciutat més activa del món a twitter) es va abocar a donar la seva opinió a favor o en contra d'Ahok o iniciatives com '*Temam Ahok*' (Amics d'Ahok), que va aconseguir més d'un milió de signatures perquè aquest es pogués presentar a les eleccions o ja sigui a nivell social, com les protestes i iniciatives tant a favor com en contra d'Ahok, que van acabar influenciant la forma en com es va dur a terme el seu procés legal.

També s'hauria de valorar el paper que han jugat els grans conglomerats oligàrquics comunicatius del país en els moviments socials previs i posteriors al cas d'Ahok.

Resulta evident que a dia d'avui s'està produint un ús polític de institucions religioses. El problema rau en fins a quin punt hi ha una frontera que separi política i religió. No és la religió una forma primigènia de política?

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- En relació als discursos polítics de partits i organitzacions previs a la sentència d'Ahok:
- Demokrat: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NPRgJoOJPY8>
- PDI-P: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bs2mVJ6S0JA>
- Gerindra: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=an5QGBNG\\_GU&t=1s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=an5QGBNG_GU&t=1s)
- Golkar: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VoYlo0ITARQ&t=195s>
- NasDem: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQ1zHtiGjUo>
- PPP: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M19cTUtmDo0>
- PSI: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVGJEHhllh8>
- MUI: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoiCF5lCzNI&t=95s>



## ANNEXOS

### DISCURS D'AHOK A LA REGÈNCIA DE SERIBU

Discurs complet d'Ahok per el qual va ser acusat per blasfèmia (a Pramuka, Pulau Seribu):

- Traducció del discurs de indonesi a anglès realitzada per Johan Sulaiman Lai:

You work, do not group together, only group together as friends. Each person becomes responsible on how much they could contribute. How do you divide the profit? It's easy. After you deduct all the costs, those of you who worked, receive 80%. Where else would you find a boss that generous? 80% goes on you. 20% to us. Pemda will get some return (the 20% share). We get the share because the original seed money is from us (Pemda). If you deal with "the bosses" they would arrange to give you 10% while they get 90%, am I not right? But with this system you get 80% while we get 20%. And where does the 20% go to? Not for us. We are like your parents. We will observe who among the participants are dishonest, or just talk only. There are a lot like this; those who only ask for their portion, there is a lot with this mentality.

Overtime, it will become clearer who is diligent and capable, because those who are diligent and honest will group together among themselves. Those who smoke will group together with fellow smokers, those who don't will group with similar non-smokers, roughly speaking, right?

Later these groups will self-form and we will help establish them as co-operations. So, you need not worry although the election now will happen sooner even if I don't get re-elected, my term still will not end until October 2017, so if this program proves successful, you will still reap the benefits with me.

Even if I don't get re-elected as governor, so I tell you this is to give you spirit/motivation. So do not think: "Ah, if Ahok does not get re-elected, Ahok's program will cease". No! I will still be governor until October 2017. Don't believe what people say, if your conscience says: "I cannot vote for Ahok right, being deceived using the Letter of Al Maidah verse 51, and so forth; that's your right, so if you feel: "I cannot vote, because I am afraid I might go to hell" being deceived, that's ok, because that would be your own personal conviction, but this program can still continue, so you don't need to feel uneasy your conscience cannot vote for Ahok, do not like Ahok (your conscience). "So, if I accept his program I don't feel right in my heart, because I feel obligated" Don't think like that. If you keep these feelings, it might cause you to die slowly, from stroke. So, think, so don't think. All these are your right as citizens of Jakarta. It just happens that I'm the governor who implements this program, so no connection with what your conscience tells you on who you should vote, ok? I think that's my message, those who hate me, don't get emotional, and poke my picture during voting in the voting booth, that vote would go to me! If you hate me, you will need to poke my picture multiple times to annul your vote, only poking once would make your vote to go to me!

Ok, that's all I have, please let me have your questions, thank you.

- Traducció del discurs de anglès a català realitzada per Roger Guiral i Maymó:

Vosaltres treballem, no us agrupeu per tal cosa, només us agrupeu com amics. Cada persona es fa responsable de quant podria aportar (en el treball). Així que com us dividiu el benefici? És fàcil. Després de deduir tots els costos, els que heu treballat rebreu el 80%.

On més trobaríeu un cap tan generós? El 80% va a vosaltres. El 20% per a nosaltres (el govern). Pemda (el govern local) obtindrà cert rendiment (el 20% de quota). Obtenim la quota perquè els diners originals de les llavors són de nosaltres (Pemda, el govern local). Si tracteu amb "els caps" ells us donarien un 10% mentre ells es quedarien amb el 90%, no estic en el cert?. Però amb aquest sistema rebeu el 80% mentre que nosaltres el 20%. I cap a on va el 20%? No per a nosaltres. Som com els vostres pares. Observarem qui entre els

participants qui és deshonest, o que l'única cosa que faci sigui parlar. N'hi ha molts d'aquests; els que només demanen la seva porció, hi ha molts amb aquesta mentalitat.

Al llarg del temps, quedarà més clar qui és diligent i capaç, perquè els que són diligents i honrats s'agruparan entre ells. Els que fumen s'agruparan amb altres fumadors, els que no s'agrupen amb gent similar, no fumadors, parlant en termes generals, oi?

Més tard aquests grups es formaran de forma autònoma i els ajudarem a establir-los com a cooperacions/cooperatives. Així que no us heu de preocupar, tot i que les eleccions es faran aviat, fins i tot si no em reelegixen (no us heu de preocupar), el meu mandat encara no acabarà fins a l'octubre del 2017, de manera que, si aquest programa resulta correcte, obtindreu els beneficis amb mi.

Tot i que no sigui reelegit com a governador, així que us dic que això per proporcionar-vos esperit / motivació. Així que no us penseu: "Ah, si Ahok no és reelegit, el programa d'Ahok cessarà". No! Encara seré governador fins a octubre de 2017. No cregueu a aquelles persones diuen això, només a la vostra consciència: "No puc votar per Ahok, sent enganyat amb la Carta d'Al Maidah vers 51, etc." és la vostra raó, així que si sentiu: "No puc votar, perquè tinc por que pugui anar a l'infern" sent enganyat, està bé, perquè seria la vostra pròpia convicció personal, però aquest programa encara pot continuar, així que no ho teniu. No heu de sentir malestar, la vostra consciència no pot votar per Ahok, no us agrada Ahok. "Així que si accepto el seu programa, no em sento bé al cor, perquè em sento obligat". Si manteniu aquests sentiments, pot provocar-vos la mort lentament, per ictus/ infart. No us ho penseu. Tots aquests són els vostres drets com a ciutadans de Jakarta. Només passa que soc el governador que implementa aquest programa, de manera que no hi ha cap connexió amb el que la vostra consciència us diu sobre qui heu de votar, d'acord? Crec que aquest és el meu missatge, els que m'odien, no us emocioneu i poseu la meua imatge durant la votació a la cabina de votació, aquest vot em correspondria! Si m'odies, haureu d'agafar la meua imatge diverses vegades per anul·lar el vostre vot, només per agafar un cop la meua imatge el vot em correspondria a mi.

Val, això és tot el que tinc a dir, si us plau, deixeu-me conèixer les vostres preguntes, gràcies.

- Anàlisi del seu discurs i la frase per la qual va ser condemnat per blasfèmia:

Ahok es trobava en la precampanya de les eleccions a governador de Jakarta, i en un dels seus míting, a la regència de Pulau Seribu, va estar parlant d'un dels programes que havia estat implementant, que consistia en que el govern proporcionava finançament a projectes d'emprenedoria realitzats per cooperatives / cooperativisme entre ciutadans.

Durant el míting va estar apel·lant a la por de certa gent a participar en el programa per por que Ahok no fos re escollit com a governador i per tant el seu programa d'ajudes quedés cancel·lat. Per emfatitzar en la problemàtica, va explicar que si no el volien votar els musulmans (degut als seus orígens com a cristià i xinès), el no votar-lo havia de ser per consciència pròpia, que no tenia cap problema amb això, i respectava que no el votessin degut a que les escriptures sagrades islàmiques diuen en certs passatges que no es pot escollir com a líder una persona que no processa la teua mateixa fe (l'islam). El que ell no volia es que no el votessin perquè es deixessin enganyar per aquells que utilitzen el vers 51 del Al Maidah<sup>27</sup> per tal d'assegurar-se que no musulmans ocupin posicions de lideratge, que no es deixessin enganyar per aquesta gent.

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5:51 - الظَّالِمِينَ الْقَوْمَ يَهْدِي اللَّهُ إِنَّ مِنْهُمْ فِتْنَةً مِّنْكُمْ يَتَوَلَّوْنَ وَمِنْ بَعْضِ أَوْلِيَاءِ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ النَّصَارَى الْيَهُودُ تَتَّخِذُوا لَا آمَنُوا الَّذِينَ أُيْهَا يَا

Al ser l'Alcorà un llibre que considerat que no pot ser traduït per tal d'entendre el seu significat total, adjunto el text literal en Àrab de la Surah Al-Maidah 51.

## DISCURSOS POLÍTICS PREVIS A LA SENTÈNCIA

### 1. Demokrat:

SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudoyono / Ex president d'Indonèsia i líder del partit Demokrat).

“Ahok (Basuki Tjahja Purnama), governador de Jakarta, considera que ha realitzat blasfèmia religiosa, i la blasfèmia religiosa està prohibida. Tornem al nostre sistema al Codi penal. A Indonèsia, hi ha jurisprudència, sobre el president, i les autoritats de la llei sobre aquest cas (religió blasfema). Qui ha estat provat culpable ha de rebre un càstig. Per tant, Ahok s'ha de processar legalment, no deixeu que Ahok sigui immune a la llei”.

### 2. PDI-P:

Megawati Soekarno Putri (líder del PDI-P).

La República d'Indonèsia és un estat de dret. Tots els ciutadans tenen la mateixa posició davant la llei. En funció de la condició de sospitosa assignada a Basuki Tjahja Purnama (Ahok), PDI-P respecte al procés legal”.

### 3. Gerindra:

Fadli Zon (vicepresident de Gerindra).

“No necessitem fer servir cap professor per acabar aquest cas, perquè aquest cas és senzill. Les frases que va dir Ahok sobre Al-maidah són clarament una blasfèmia, i també ha demanat disculpes i la persona que es disculpa vol dir que admet el seu error. Aleshores, què passa? Hem de fer el procés legal”.

### 4. Golkar:

Nusron Wahid (membre de Golkar).

”Tot el text està lliure d'interpretació, l'únic que interpreta l'Alcorà correctament, legalment, i perfectament són Al·là i els seus missatgers. A la literatura, hi ha un procés “creatiu” que vol dir que la persona que més entén sobre el text, és la persona que ha creat aquest text. De manera que només és Ahok qui sap i entén perfectament el que va dir a la gent de Kepulauan Seribu, i Ahok va dir que no volia dir blasfèmia”.

### 5. PSI:

El PSI (Partai Solidaritas Indonesia) encara no estava format quan va succeir el cas d'Ahok, per tant no es pot tenir una resposta clara respecte a la seva opinió, però s'ha de suposar que ja que una part dels líders del PSI provenen de l'antic gabinet d'Ahok i una majoria al partit són cristians, la seva opinió seria favorable a no condemnar per blasfèmia a l'exgovernador de Jakarta. Per conformar la seva opinió s'ha agafat de referència la opinió d'un dels seus actuals líders.

Guntur Romli (Partidari d'Ahok, actualment membre del Partai Solidaritas Indonesia).

No és una qüestió de blasfèmia, sinó de trencar o eliminar paraules. Anteriorment, Buni Yani (l'home que va editar i retallar una paraula de la declaració Ahok i que també comparteix el vídeo després d'haver estat editat a les xarxes socials) havia admès que havia omès una paraula molt important. El 27 de setembre de 2016 hi ha un vídeo nou de Kompas, que va dir que Ahok està feliç perquè la gent de Kepulauan Seribu ha collit peix krapu i, a més, el govern provincial va penjar el vídeo a youtube i no hi ha cap problema. Però, després de 9 dies (6 d'octubre de 2016), Buni Yani va penjar el vídeo amb una durada de 30 segons i va fer un títol al vídeo "Religió Blasfèmia?". Després que va penjar aquest vídeo, les persones que comencen a compartir aquest vídeo són més de 1000, i els espectadors arriben a cent mil; I després vaig dir a Buni Yani que fes un aclariment sobre el que havia fet, però no va admetre que va tallar una paraula en aquell moment, però finalment, aquesta nit ha admès que va tallar una paraula. I, a més, no va posar la font de vídeo. Com a periodista, les coses bàsiques que hem de saber és posar la font, i ell, no va dir-ho, de manera que hi ha un factor intencionat. És

per això que faig denúncies a la policia de Buni Yani i també tinc una altra raó per la qual el denuncio, perquè si ens fixem en el facebook i el twitter de Buni Yani, tot l'estat d'ell demostra que és un odiós d'Ahok i partidari d'Anies Baswedan.

#### 6. NasDem:

Surya Paloh (President de NasDem).

Avui, la policia ha elevat la condició d'Ahok a sospitós en el cas de blasfèmia religiosa. Estic preocupat per això, però respecto i agraeixo les decisions que s'han pres en relació a Ahok i les he enviat al poder judicial. Per tant, totes les parts d'aquest país s'han d'unir i respectar el sistema legal existent en el país i mantenir la unitat a Indonèsia, de manera que el procés legal pugui funcionar el millor possible”.

#### 7. PPP:

Romahurmuzy (President de PPP).

Indonèsia és un estat de dret. Per tant, nosaltres (president i membres de l'organització i president del partit) no podem anar davant les lleis. Perquè tot el que digui el líder del partit, el braç superior de l'Estat, el mantindrà el poble. Així doncs, no fem declaracions que confonguin l'atmosfera (fent que l'ambient sigui més calent), perquè en aquest moment l'ambient encara és calent. Donem una declaració tranquil·la i conciliadora, perquè la gent necessita pau i frescor.

#### 8. PKS:

No he aconseguit trobar declaracions d'aquest partit.

Organitzacions de Societat Civil:

##### 1. MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia):

Tengku Zulkarnain (Ustad a Riau i membre de la cúpula de MUI).

Hi ha dues paraules destacades de la frase d'Ahok relacionada amb Al-Maidah, és a dir, mentir en l'ús d'Al-Maidah 51 i deixar-se enganyar. Tot i que la frase real d'Ahok és "mentida mitjançant la lletra d'Al-Maidah", hi ha dos significats. Un exemple és "matar amb una pistola". Això vol dir que hi ha persones que maten i eines per matar, i en aquest cas és la pistola.

Després hi ha dues conseqüències legals que ha de suportar Ahok. En primer lloc, Ahok al·lega que la carta d'Al-Maidah és una eina per fer mentides, i la segona, que els estudiosos (ulama) que ensenyen Surah al-Maidah als musulmans són uns mentiders. Aleshores el MUI va decideix:

- El vers 51 de Dalil Al maidah, explícitament és una prohibició de triar jueus i cristians com a líders, o prohibir que els no musulmans es converteixin en un líder.
- Ulama ha de dir als musulmans que l'elecció d'un líder musulmà és obligatòria.
- Tots els musulmans estan obligats a creure la veritat de Surah al-Maidah 51 com a guia per triar els líders.
- En afirmar que el contingut del Surat al Maidah 51 que conté la prohibició de triar jueus i cristians per ser líders és una mentida, la llei és haram i es declara com a blasfema contra la religió.
- Declarar "mentir a l'Ulama que va lliurar l'argument de Al-Maidah 51 sobre la prohibició de triar líders no musulmans" és un insult als ulamas i als musulmans.

A partir del punt anterior, la declaració d'Ahok es classifica en insultar l'Alcorà i insultar a l'Ulama.

Cosa que té conseqüències legals. Així que el MUI recomana:

- El govern i la comunitat han de mantenir l'harmonia de la religió, la societat, la nació i l'estat.

- El govern està obligat a prevenir qualsevol blasfèmia de la religió alcorànica i islàmica, per tant, en no deixar-ho en llibertat.
- Els funcionaris de la llei, han de prendre mes ures fermes contra tots els que fan blasfèmia a l'Alcorà i els ensenyaments de l'Islam, així com insults a ulamas i musulmans d'acord amb les lleis aplicables.
- Es demana a l'aparell de seguretat que realitzi de forma proactiva l'aplicació de la llei de manera estricta, ràpida, proporcionada i professional, tenint en compte el sentit de la comunitat perquè la gent tingui confiança en l'aplicació de la llei.
- Es demana al públic que es mantingui en calma i que no prengui mesures pel seu propi peu i que ho anunciï a les autoritats policials. Assabenteu-vos de la blasfèmia religiosa i informeu a les autoritats.

## ENTREVISTES

Les entrevistes estaran organitzades de forma semi-estructurada, basant-se en un guió bàsic de cinc preguntes i d'altres quatre preguntes que contextuals que mostro a continuació:

1. Pregunta introductòria (Qui és, quin es el seu càrrec, etc.).
2. Explicació del motiu de l'entrevista.
3. A quin grup d'interès pertany l'entrevistat i per quin motiu considera que el seu sector es rellevant a nivell institucional.
4. Pregunta específica per a cada entrevistat en relació al seu grup i la opinió d'aquest en relació a l'estudi de cas. Exemple: Rumadi Ahmad, president de l'Institut de Recerca i Recerca Humana Nahdlatul Ulama (Lakpesdam NU), va dir que diversos casos de difamació, inclosos HB Yasin i Arswendo Atmowiloto, van sorgir a causa de la pressió massiva i van ser subjectius. Com a representat de NU, comparteix vostè la opinió de Pak Rumadi Ahmad?

## GUIÓ ENTREVISTES EN ANGLÈS

- 1- Indonesia is a country that defends and promote religious diversity (as demonstrated by the motto of the State "*Bhineka tunggal ika*" and Pancasila). How is the relationship between politics and religion articulated in this context?
- 2- In the same way, since the period of "*Reformasi*" do you think that this relationship has been leading to a politization of religion?
- 3a- If the answer 2 is affirmative: Does you consider that the sentence of 2 years of prison for blasphemy to Ahok has a relation with this possible politicization of the religious sphere with a political use of the Religious Courts?
- 3b- If the answer 2 is negative: What is your opinion about the sentence of 2 years of prison for blasphemy to Ahok at the year 2017? Do you think that this sentence represents a political use of the Religious courts?
- 4- There are a whole set of public figures that are immersed at politics in positions of great power since long time ago (such as SBY, Megawati, Prabowo, the children of Suharto, etc.). Do you think that these elites use religion as a way to remain at power and that their "*Partai*" and civil society in general continue giving to them their support?
- 5- When at the first round of the 2017 elections in Jakarta no one obtained more than 50% of the votes and Yudhoyono gave his support to Anies, balanced the results against Ahok causing his defeat. Do you think this has to be seen as an ideological approach of Anies and Yudhoyono or therefore the vote was based more in the religion of the candidate than on the political program of the candidates?

## GUIÓ ENTREVISTES EN CATALÀ

1- Sabem que Indonèsia és un país que defensa i promou la diversitat religiosa (així ho demostren el lema de l'Estat i el Pancasila), com s'articula la relació entre la política i la religió en aquest context?

2- En aquesta mateixa línia, des del període de la "Reformasi", creu que aquesta relació ha anat derivant cap a una politització de la religió?

3a- Si la resposta 2 és afirmativa: Considera que la sentència a 2 anys de presó per blasfèmia a Ahok té a veure amb aquesta possible politització de l'esfera religiosa amb una utilització política dels Tribunals Religiosos?

3b- Si la resposta 2 és negativa: Quina opinió li mereix la sentència a 2 anys de presó per blasfèmia a Ahok de l'any 2017? Considera que aquesta sentència representa una utilització política dels Tribunals Religiosos?

4- Hi ha tot un seguit de figures públiques que estan immerses en política en càrrecs de molt poder des de fa molts anys (com SBY, Megawati, Prabowo, els fills de Suharto, etc.). Vostè creu que aquestes elits utilitzen la religió com a vehicle per mantenir-se al poder i que els seus "Partai" i la societat civil en general els segueixi donant recolzament?

5- Quan en la primera volta de les eleccions del 2017 a Jakarta ningú va obtenir més del 50% dels vots i Yudhoyono va donar el seu suport a Anies, va equilibrar la balança en contra de Ahok provocant la derrota d'aquest. Vostè creu que això va tenir a veure en una aproximació ideològica de Anies i Yudhoyono o en canvi el vot va estar basat més en la religió del candidat que no pas en el programa polític d'aquests?

## TRANSCRIPCIÓ ENTREVISTES

**Entrevista al Dr. Hakimul Ikhwan: Sociòleg. Investigador i professor al PSKK (Center of Population and Policy studies), UGM.**

People use our politician or the elite, they use, I called 3 weapons:

First economic capital, money, can be used to compete for the office, in parliament. Some groups that may have less money or that still got a lot of money they may have the second weapon and it's the culture, the cultural symbolism.

*Yes, for the example the place that I was living with my friend, they are Karo, the leaders use their Karo culture to promote themselves as a leader in the 'Kepala Desa' or whatever.*

Here for example in Yogyakarta we have the Queen, who always nominate herself as a member of the parliament, and of course for sure, every election, she won, she maybe don't have the amount of money of some other, but because of the cultural symbolism, she always success, won the election and have the seat on the Parliament. And some very famous religious figures, elite, let's say, we call it "blue blood", like aristocratic, but it is in terms of religion, who have the... You know kyai?

No.

They are religious leaders, like a priest, a cleric.

*Like an Ustat?*

Yes, but in the highest level, the leaders of NU for example (Nahdlatul Ulama); the leaders of Muhammadiyah, for instance, so, the son or daughters, or the big family of the founders of NU, will use that symbolism of the grandson, granddaughter of that important person will easily won more popularity.

Now we said the economic and the culture. What happen to the other leaders? because we are in a democracy, people want to get advantage, to get benefit from the competition.

The third group to want to get benefit in order to win the election, the competition, they use religion. Because religion, in order to get more support, to attract emotion of the voters, and that's in the election, somehow it works

*For sure.*

For sure, but then it is not only in politics, it's even come to the other practice of the daily live, for the example, in order for you to be, to have more followers for your Instagram, for your twitter, for your YouTube channel, you need to be, you know, more commercial, more 'viral', you know. How to be more viral, more noticeable for the audience? Saying something controversial, you need to show that you have that strong statement, and unfortunately the strong statement its almost always related to something that is a threat of our diversity, you know? So, in shock, if it talk about religion and politics, for many actors, for many politician they use the religious symbolism exactly the same as economic capital or cultural capital in order to get benefit from the open competition of democracy; so it's, you know, it's simple it is not something related to...

*Yes, I know, for example in the book that I showed to you, it's more of less the same, in Spain, the use for example they own way, issue of my community, the Catalans, that we want the Independence, so they use it, they say 'vote me, because I'll work in order that the Catalans don't get the independence; so people trust in them. They make problematic comments about the Catalans, to yes, to increase their popularity.*

Exactly, and also, some literature says for instance the case of the European Union. Somehow, religion has also been a part in the strength sense that we are Europe, because you know, Christian, right? And also, the competition in the USA in instance to kick out Obama, they use religion.

*Yes, saying like 'Obama it's not a good Christian'.*

Exactly, so I mean, it is a practice in many places, how politician elite use religion, or any kind of symbolism in order to get more vote or also to lessen the voters for the competitors.

I want to add other things in Indonesia.

Why religion and politics so contentious in Indonesia? I mean, why religion and the state, with the image of nationalism, use always in the contentious religion? Because we have an unfinished project so far, in defining where is the place of religion in our state system.

*It's not defined in Pancasila if it is in the public life on the private?*

Pancasila just give the principle for, but how we really situate the religion in the policy it's still not clear. Somehow, for instance, the ministry of religious affairs. We have that ministry of religious affairs. It is not genuine by the Indonesian state. It was a legacy of the Dutch colonialism, the Ministry of the Religious Affairs. That's the ministry where the state tries to intervene. To intervene the religious life, so how to control the religious life? The government, the state, the Dutch, they used the ministry of the religious affairs, to control the practice of religion. That means that practice of religion, the religious community, something related to religion it's not clearly out of the State domain. Because everything in the perspective of secularism for instance, we don't talk about religion in the policy, we just think about the 'public', the public interest, put aside anything related to religious symbolism. But that was not the case here in Indonesia, because from it really, it's really, I mean, how to say it... The genuineness the real history of the religious affairs for instance

it is under the state control. Until now, for instance, in our current issue in Indonesia, why president Jokowi appoint a religious minister that it's from the military? That have a background in the military and not in the religious organizations?

*You mean Prabowo?*

No, I mean, Fachrul Razi.

*I don't know who is him.*

Yes, but after it you can search, the new cabinet appointed by the president Jokowi, the minister of the religious affairs has a military background, he is not from a religious organization.

*I'll search information about that.*

Yes, and then, the people has had something in their mind. What the government want from the Religious ministry, if the minister comes from the military? And then that's all, it seems that the government want more scrutiny, more control on the what the cabinet of Jokowi call 'Radical groups. Yeah? Because you know in the election it seems that the Muslim, Muslim voters, many groups linked with the Islam are not supporting Jokowi.

*They saw Jokowi as a bad Muslim in relation with the other candidates.*

Exactly, and in the other side, Jokowi and his time at that time, use the camping of radical Islam. Who vote for Prabowo mean that the vote for the radical Muslim that they will threat for the Pancasila, that the, you know, the binary between the supporters of Jokowi and the supporters of Prabowo, and now, finally, Jokowi appoint the minister of religious affairs from the military? Fachrul Razi, and then it's said. Okay, so he even wants to have more control on the religious life just to give you a picture of how the state have the ambition, the political agenda to even keep control, intervene the religious affairs, and it is of course not on the current situation. If we back to the history of Indonesia, it was a legacy of the Dutch colonialism. You might be familiar with what we call here in Indonesia 'Divide and control Politics'. You divide the group; you only keep facilities to one group and then you oppress the other group. In term of religious group, the main group will be facilitated by the state, provide money, budget, support their school, but you don't care about politics, don't care and involve about politics.

*Just focus on education, and on other things.*

And worship, just do worship, pray, do good and we will facilitate you. But the other group who involve in politics, criticize government or they disagree with the government, they call it as a bad Muslim, and then they put pressure on them. And from them we know what we call as Political Islam. The genealogy, the root of the political Islam it's the contentious relation, between the religious group in particular Islam with the State, with the government. What we call as Political Islam it's a group that always inventory opposition with the government, they are not easily agree with the government.

*Well, I will say that the Indonesia Independence was caught by this groups, like Sarekat Islam, that also fight as Muslim and as a nationalist to catch the independence, so it's going to be an issue always interrelated, with the thing about who makes pressure to who.*

That's the problem, that Sakerat Islam and many fighters for Independence they are supporting the nation, and you might read a book by MacVay, a very old book from 1940-1950 that say that in the history, a group that associated as a rebellious group, Islam rebellious group, actually they are not against the State, they are not a



group that wants to separate from the State, they are against the government, something really different; they not agree with Sukarno, and also mean that they don't agree, they criticized Suharto, but this doesn't mean that...

*So, they don't want to change the State, they want to change the leaders that manage this State.*

Yes, yes, perfect, that also happens in Aceh, the movement in Aceh have a long story of fighting in Aceh, and also the PRRI, this is in Sumatra, in 1960's, it's associated with Islam and stigmatized by the New Order of Suharto as a rebellious group.

*Well, Suharto only wanted Golkar there, so anyone that opposite to Golkar mindset it's just a rebellious group.*

Yes, and any group that don't want to include to the P3, United Development Party...

*But they were not opposition groups, they were just the 'Partai that Golkar, there are other 'Partai' to suppose a democracy, but they will be always agreeing with the regime.*

The point is that we have the history of the current situation its somehow a reflection of a long history of contentious relation between the State and the Religious groups. So, Pancasila, yes, we have it but it's not easily solved by the 5 principles of Pancasila, because how we agree on the position of religion in the state system, the political system, it's not clear yet

*It's also quite impossible in this moment.*

Yes, but let's say for example in America; it's much easier for them, because you can express your religious believe in public, no one can't intervene your religious expressions, and State will be clear in this situation: State will protect anyone who want to show their believe, and that's instead that in many countries they have this really clear, the situation; in UK for instance you can wear, you can dress based on your religion, you have the right to have a holiday in your religious festivity, that's your right, if you are worker you can say it to your employer, if you are student you can say it to your teacher, according to your religious affiliation, but that's not here.

*Here they tried to make a mix, you make some festivities for Muslim, then you do some festivity for Christmas.*

And then out of these 6 religions, no other religious celebration.

*If you are a Sikh, you need to say that you are Hindu.*

Yes, so because of somehow of delimitation and no rule for others, that's you know, it's a room for conflict, for tension, and also back to your first question about politicization, that's open the room for politician to makeover in this situation, to use religion as a political weapon, political instrument because it's not clear.

*(Laughs). You answer really nice, this also answered many of my questions.*

I don't know what I need to answer now.

*Now you answered the first and the second questions, and we will arrive to the third one that its: OK, there is some kind of politicization of the religion in this country, so now I can ask the third: Does you consider that the sentence of 2 years of prison for blasphemy to Ahok has a relation with this possible politicization of the religious sphere with a political use of the religious courts?*

Yes, it is, is part of the politicization of Religion but again it is a reflection of an unfinished system to put a clear between state and religion, because for me we have too many laws regarding to the religious live, in instance to the house of worship. We have a regulation called 'Peraturan Bersama 3 Menteri'. A regulation of the agreement of 3 ministries. Sorry, we call it SKB (Surat Keputusan Bersama). SKB 3 Menteri.

*But it is law regulation?*

Yes, it is.

But it's like UUN1945?

It is related to the religious matters, related to the building of the house of worship, were the religious ministries, the ministers of the religious and the home affairs, and also... They make an agreement of 3 ministries; they put particular requirement in order to build a house of worship, in instance, you need to have a sign, a signature from 60 of the people in the surrounding areas, you need to formally collect 60 signatures from the people and you need to have at least (might I'm wrong) but I'm not sure but at instance you need to have 90 members that will do worship in this house of worship, you need the list of the name and the formally signature as a proof. You know, it's too details. You know, it's too... I don't like the regulation because then that make people on the grassroots, easily mobilized in order to close, against the building of the house of worship because of this regulation. So, I think... back to your question about the politicization of Ahok, the sentence of 2 years for Ahok, I think its again it's not only about religion, if we talk about politics there are...

*Many actors that play...*

Many actors, many interests, something that we can see only in the surface but it plays a rule in the making of the decisions. One think in instance as an example, there is still contention, contentious relation between the police and the military in Indonesia. You know that in Indonesia?

Yes.

Yes, OK. And when the people mobilized to Jakarta, the police or the State should be very confident to protect the city from the demonstrators...

*From the mass.*

Yes, from the mass that came to Jakarta, some people said millions of people that come to Jakarta, and there is no reason for State to protect Jakarta, but at that time, there is no support from the military. The police only could be the only responsible for the security in Jakarta at that time, only the police. And they think that they were not strong in off to cover Jakarta and no support from military, for why? Because you know, the issue, because so far, the institution that get a lot of benefit, the more money, the more budget is the police, and they are the responsible for the domestic security, domestic defense; when the military only deal with the issue of defense; don't deal with this kind of affairs. The military said that yeah, it's your problem, your responsibility (referring to the police), you deal with that, because the police said that they are not strong in off to cover it. Because of this, because the police said that they are not strong in off to cover it; and they said just put him in jail, make a decision, come a court, you make a decision, you sentence him to satisfy the people. Something that out of the religious issues, something out of this you know, something related with the religion, might be with the political economy, between the police and the military, how they share the money, the budget, the resources, because of this, you know...

*This is one point that I didn't catch till now, I was making all the context and I didn't think to put this on the research.*

Sure, I suggest to order things about other dimensions that give influence to this. I would like that you follow for instance, there is a candidate in the election of before presidency, Gatot Nurmantyo, he was a military leader...

*So, in the elections about legislative or the Jakarta election?*

No no, he was on the top leader of the military, and then he resign for the pension, because of the age, at that time, he retired, and then he tried to construct the image that he very close in relation with the Muslim, to the religious groups, and one think that you need to consider is the relation between police and the military. You know, the police earn a huge benefit from the project of terrorism for instance, the previous head of the police, Tito Karnavian, he was the head of specialized anti-terrorism, 'Detasemen Khusus 88' and then he appoint to be head of the police in a really young age, really young age according to the hierarchy of the police, he should not be promoted yet, but he has the achievement in the police force of 88, who fight against the terrorism, and if you talk about terrorism, you are talking about something related again to the resources, to the economy, to the global agenda...

*The budget...*

The budget, yeah, huge budget, and police until today get huge benefit in terms of money, in terms of budget because of the issue of terrorism, the issue of radicalism and you know that means money, and the budget of the police equal to the budget of the army, to the air force in Indonesia, even equal to the benefit of the ministry of the defense, huge budget. And that give more energy for the police to get more pressure and the reuse the term terrorism and radicalism, so when we talk about radicalism, terrorism, in a State, we need to consider the political economy behind it, you know, the interest of economy and politics be behind it.

*But also, this kind of terms (referring to terrorism and radicalism) you need to follow some way, because depending on how you define it, your result it's going to be one or another.*

But because it is too losing, how we define the thread, the radical groups, the terrorism, it is not clear definition, and then exactly as our discussion before, the elite, they man over in-between this hole to get benefit for them.

*So nice, so now you asked the fourth question too.*

**Entrevista al Dr. Abdul Gaffar Karim: Politòleg. Professor a FISIPOL al departament de Política i Governabilitat, UGM i al Prof. Joash Tapiheru: Estudiant de recerca de postgrau i professor al departament de PolGov. Investigador al Centre d'Estudis de Política i Governança, FISIPOL UGM.**

A: Abdul Gaffar Karim J: Joash Tapiheru

*(Interview started 15 minutes ago but the recorder tool did not work well and I lost the biggest part of the conversation with Dr. Abdul)*

A: Religion it's just one of the factors

J: This is how religion became at that particular moment determining factor even if it is not determinant, but at some point (determined) the current of the situation.

Even does they know, some of the Muslim groups protesting against Ahok, even some of they knew that the protestant movement was funded by a Chinese group of Tomy Winata.

In that particularly movement, religion it's the main factor, but only in that moment, never become constantly a determining factor.

*Well, my hypothesis is that at first he make something that make angry many people, he kill a lot, well I mean he take out of the power many corrupt people, he make many transparency in the government of Jakarta, and of course there is many people that it's not interested in that so when it arrived the reelection, they wanted just to find the way to take him out of the government election, so they found that this would be a good way to kick him out. Make the people exalted, make them go to demonstrations, so then the tribunals will get forced to make a sentence against him, so it was just use as a weapon at this moment.*

*This is the point that I want to arrive with the interviews, okay, from the academics, of civil society or Muhammadiyah or Nahlatul Ulama and by the visions of some Partai, to more or less understand if there is some different visions between this different actors; according to this case and the politicization of religion in this country. So, my point for you as an academics it's to know why this case has been so problematic and why religion has been involved in a political affair as this one.*

J: I mean, the term use, I mean, I feel a little bit uncomfortable with that, so it means that religion it's just a use, but it neglect the fact that some people just call the religious believe and it became, it was the main motivator why they get involve to this movement; but some others may use that (religion) in an instrumental way. This is kind of spectrum of a picture with so many kinds of colors in this spectrum; and religion occupies different position in this spectrum.

*One think that I didn't witted in the interview, was the fact that police was alone in the demonstrations, because if military said that they will help in the demonstrations, maybe the tribunals will not be forced to make a sentence against him, cause if military and police are together, they are more strong in the demonstrations, but as it was not like this, they didn't need to finish the case as fast as possible to dissolve the demonstrations that happen in that moment in Jakarta.*

J: I think that the situation was more complex than that, and there was more states, if the authority dissolve the gathering the 411 and the 212 gathering, they would themselves as the object for target practice, they will be blame in the entire democracy and even worse, the entire Islam. I mean they were in a very difficult situation, I mean, so what they did is what they did, they allow the gatherings to take place, but then they tried to localize the gathering and the impacts, so they were in a more complex situation that what we just discuss.

*Of course, I'm just tried to understand it, because I'm coming here without understanding absolutely anything, starting by the language (laughs) so then I just want to know all the factors that finished in this conclusion. Okay now he is killed politically (Ahok) and now we have Anies as the governor of Jakarta for the next four years, so...*

J: Because this groups didn't use only the religious discourse, the also use the discourse of democracy, what they said that what they were doing they are doing the exercise of the democratic rights; freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold the religious believe and to defend it, they use this kind of discourse, so it wasn't really detach from the formally ruling regime in Indonesia, the democratic regime, they still use some elements of that discourse.

*Well, I need to think on it, but yeah; so, you consider that it has been a politicization of the religion in this case, to make a condemn of him or it was just one of the facts to condemn him?*

J: I don't, if I want to answer this question with my own paradigm, let's say this: the politicization of religion it's kind of, how to say it, it implies that religion is not politics initially, but then, it becomes political, or it becomes politicized, while for me religion is political for excellence since the beginning.

*It's the way that the people focus on the society and the way that we build our own society so yeah for me what was is shocking is that in Europe we have a huge separation between this kind of powers, and here it is all in just one line, so religion move mountains, religion is the deep feeling about all the sentiments and spirituality, so if you instrumentalist religion to take you to the place that you want, you will get it, because people will follow you if they trust in what you are saying, so... (conversation drift to other matters).*

*So, this is a country that have more Muslims in the world and it's also a multi-confessional that accept 6 religions, so yeah, at some moment it will cause some problematic at the moment that it comes to the government.*

A: But it gives you the picture of religion and politics in Indonesia, and you get it right when you said that its never separated between these two realms, but in European countries these two things are totally separated, I mean, unconsciously it still there

*And also here, during the Suharto regime, the allow Muhammadiyah and other organizations, to 'OK' do what you want in education system but don't try to focus on politics because here its Golkar who says what you need to do or not, and we don't want problems with you; and now, Suharto fall and start the 'Reformasi', and this line that separated one power with the other its totally invisible, so it all just became part of one.*

A: Can we continue discussing about this later? (One student from UGM arrived to the table and needed to go to the office with him, so he said to leave this conversation for later when he finishes to talk with the student)

*(Laughs and they talk a moment in Bahasa Indonesia; conversation goes to other issues for some moments).*

J: The think is that the separation in Suharto regime was clear, but then if we return to the case of Ahok, I need to say that I'm one of him sympathizers, but I can also be critical with him by looking it in this way: Ahok, his administration, the kind of power relation that he created during his rule as governor in Jakarta, he rule by the technocratic state, he makes transparency, accountability, even technical manage, and it didn't created any political space to maneuver, like In Indonesia, that it's hard to have critical thinking, it was hard to criticize him, on the same field of policy. He was so technocratic, and he had kind of putting too much attention to the details, so, in this kind of situation, of he gets out of critical, it gets against Ahok, so people still wanted a space to make political actions, and religion, and that exactly it's not politicization of religion so if we look at this case, religion in this moment was the only possible way to engage Ahok politically instead of technocratically, so they need to react, they use religion, so it was the only way available to engage against Ahok.

Well, he was a perfect target.

J: Yeah, yeah, he was perfect target for them I mean you know you came without perspective so, he came with the perspective as if religion he was totally apolitical in his case, but then he didn't provide political tools or means, from the perspective that I just mention, it has been political all time (religion) and people just use it, were the formal political means where not available.

I assume you have read a lot about Ahok.

*It hardly, because 99% of the articles are in Bahasa (Indonesia), so I need the help of my friends to translate it, so I just read the articles that I could in English, BBC, by the media, because what all could be academical*

article are basically in Bahasa Indonesia, because the only one that write academical articles about it it's in Bahasa.

J: What is the impression that you have about Ahok?

*That he just enter to the government with a weapon, and you cannot enter like this to the government, because you going to make angry a lot of people, many people and many business that use politics to have power, in this kind of friendship that I'm legislative and my brother make pencils, so I buy Ijt pencils and he (Ahok) has been really against all of this, so he make some people angry with that. So, they said we cannot continue in the heart of Jakarta, we cannot continue having someone like him because he will destroy all this sphere that we created since Suharto disappear of the government.*

J: They tried, but it was hard to catch him in the issue of corruption, they tried, but they fail with this. They tried with the cases of Sum Barbara Hospital, and then the reclamation of the goal of Jakarta, they try it several times to capture him in some cases of corruption, but they failed with all of them so finally they turn to religion, to kill him.

*And you, as a member affiliated in Nahlatul Ulama? (as before the interview he makes a joke as he was affiliated in Nahlatul Ulama).*

J: No, no, no, I was born in a Christian family, and I turn agnostic now.

*Ok, so I cannot enter to the question by here.*

J: Don't worry with it, I'm find with that (referring as he is agnostic). And I was a Roman in my previous life, so your country was one of my provinces. (Laughs).

*Well, my country its really crazy right now. Conversation turn to other issues\*.*

*And is in the Catalan case the issue it's related to nationalism, in Indonesia the issue its related to Religion.*

J: Well, in Indonesia the case it's also related to nationalism, related with the issue of what is the meaning of being Indonesian, do you have to be a Muslim to claim yourself as an Indonesia? Because if it's like this, the non-Muslim will be second class citizen, they wouldn't have the same political rights in this case, so that's how the government election in Jakarta became not only national, but also international issue, they had, they organize the followers, the supporters across the state and out of it; also in the UK we had a group of Ahok followers and also his opponents.

*Really? But, Indonesian community?*

Yeah, Indonesian community, so it was not only a political issue limited to Jakarta, but it went beyond the boudoirs of Jakarta because people try to identify themselves with the power play in this governor elections in that time, but you know, there are links with the governor elections of 2016 and the president elections, the last one that we had couple months ago.

*(Conversation derived another time to issues not related with the Interview matters).*

J: The case of Ahok was where all of this begun. At that time, at 2015, I was still here, I didn't go to UK, I was here giving lectures in one of our lectures that it's about measuring the qualities of democracy, and I try to stay known about how much fragile our democracy is, because we are prowl to use primordial issues at it is religion, political instruments or commodities, and it happen exactly like that a year after. And in that time, I was

disappointing in the governor elections. I was knowing that Ahok will run again for the governorship and he was kind of perfect target for identity politics. Specially with his kind of policies, that it was like “Oh please, shot me”.

*(Laughs).*

*And yes, if you put this kind of cases with the thing that Indonesia is a centralized but decentralized country at the same time like its geographically totally decentralized but then all need to pass by Jakarta to be office, and you make this with that Indonesia it's a new country and till 98 you don't start to have what is considered a democracy, so it's so fragile, and anything can make that it all become a chaos, and it's quite interesting to try to understand how it works, and filly the case (referring to Ahok) it's not a trial to a person, it's a trial to a country, and how this country the reformation that it's still happen, how it's going to finish in the bases of this country.*

J: Yeah, and personally I was so disappointed with what happen in the case of Ahok, even I give my sympathy to Ahok, because you know, I was also part of a minority religiously and ethnically, but at the same time I also concerned that he presented himself as if he was kind of unapproachable, he could not be criticized, and it was very dangerous for a democracy.

*Yes, and for this reason you need to have an opposition that says that you are doing this or this not well, like now for example in Anise case (the conversation drift to a possible case of corruption of Anise this last days) ...*

J: The substance of a democracy is exactly that it has no substance.

*(And the conversation drift again to definitions of democracy and not the case of the interview) ...*

*Maybe SBY was a critical point in the Ahok case, because if he didn't given support to Anise, maybe Ahok could win, because if SBY as a chairman of Demokrat Partai, if he didn't give support Ahok could win, but as he give support to Anise, all the voters of Demokrat go to vote for Anise.*

J: But do you think this move was religiously motivated? For me no.

*No, I mean, for me was just an instrumentation to finish with him.*

J: I mean, probably, for me, the answer for your questions it's like exactly the same that I mention in first. Religion was just one among many factors, and that moment when it became the main actors but it never constantly like that, it happen just occasionally, and the second one is the one that I described after that, probably it is workly to think about other perspective, probably religion was the only political instrument available to the ones that against Ahok to engage him politically. Because otherwise they would be shut down since the beginning because Ahok for some people was so perfect, he was the embodiment about what middle class people wanted for Jakarta.

*But high class...*

J: Yeah, high class was not so happy. It steps into many people tools.

**Entrevista al Prof. Purwo Santoso: Cap de departament i professor del Departament de Política i Govern de FISIPOL UGM i el Prof. Joash Tapiheru: Estudiant de recerca de postgrau i professor al departament de PolGov. Investigador al Centre d'Estudis de Política i Governança, FISIPOL UGM.**

P: Purwo Santoso

J: Joash Tapiheru

*So, let's start by a general one that it's: Indonesia related with Pancasila and the motto of the country "Bhineka Tunggal Ika" it's handling religion and politics, and since Suharto fall and the starting of the 'Reformasi' and change all the system, it's possible that it has been leading to a politicization of the religion?*

P: Actually, the politicization of the religion had been happening the entire life, whenever and whatever we do. It is a strong temptation to politicize or just use it for a political purpose. It's normal and particularly saw when we engage with adversary politicians. We did have this kind of experience in the 50's when the country was preparing experimenting with liberal ideology and then authoritarian control, with Soekarno and Suharto, and then follow Suharto the Order Baru that bring back the liberal agenda, and then the focus of politicization are lifting when liberal authority was there in the 50's, the politicization of religion was taking place with the political parties and the religious leaders who want to go to power to religious channel and now a days the same but in between we had the authoritarian rule that means that the state kick out the religion of power for political purpose. So, it's just inherent in the politics in Indonesia not necessary with the fall of Suharto.

*But I mean, during Suharto regime there was a clear line. Like Muhammadiyah, Nahlatul ulama, you take care of your own affairs but don't try to enter in my own...*

P: But then it was the same State who do the game, who play out the religion, they make the impression that they are under control the religion, but it's exactly the same but with different players, but the major of politicization of religion it's just the player and the purpose.

*Of course that religion it's ethics and also a way to structure the society so its politics yes or yes and then we enter directly to the case that I'm treating, the Ahok case, the leader of Nahlatul Ulama, Rumadi Ahmad, he was the chairman of the research institute and also of the Human research of Nahlatul Ulama (Lakpesdam) and he said that different cases of defamation a HB Yasin and Arswendo Atmowiloto, it has been really viral and commented for everyone, and it was a sentence according to the people; it was a massive pressure and it was also a subjective sentence that it was just because there was a big mass of people that was asking to condemn them, this kind of people for the defamation that they could say or not.*

P: But sometimes I don't really remember the details of the effect. But again, this is just diversity of the game and doing politics as this it was religious conduct. I think in the case of Arswendo...

J: He was sentence to jail

P: There was an art performance...

J: Well Arswendo he made a pool to who is the most popular pickers and he put Muhammad III; it was in 1990, I think... He wasn't born yet (referring to me, laughs).

P: Yeah, but this is the think and it was conflicting idea within the notion of research; this people is asking about opinion and the expectation normative expectations and there was a gap. I don't know it was a mass or the state who play the game. And this practice is divided now.



*Now are divided, because before it was all one you want to mean?*

P: Sorry?

*So, this kind of practices was all one before and now they are trying to divide it for one side religion and for another side politics to try to make a mix of it all to regulate the country.*

P: I don't follow your logic and evidence; because each party are playing the game, they want to make political advantage to manipulate religious beliefs, religious identity so everyone does the same.

*An its ethical that this Partai are doing this kind of issues, they are instrumentation religion? So, till what point this we can consider that it's ethical or democratic?*

P: We need to have a prove, I cannot just have opinion on basis of nowhere, but what are the indicators that you want to measure?

*If you want we can do it to a specific question that it's in the elections of Jakarta governor, after the SBY get out and just Anise and Ahok can have the power and then the Partai Demokrat get out of the elections, SBY, well his son, give support to Anise, so he gives his support basically because according to his ideas and the ideas of Anise they are more together than Ahok. So, what till point get religion used and instrumentalist in a way to win the elections and as a way that Ahok don't get the power again?*

P: Very much, and that was the emergence of the political game playing out with the religion and it was worrying me so much because I was anticipating that the game was not just for there it was a game for all nation and it was basically Jakarta and Jogja are the basically translatable, so if something is applicable in Jakarta or Jogja, it became threat out...

*So, it became a rule for the country*

P: Exactly, and I was worrying and surely it was political game with religion. Why? Ahok was saying the same think that Abdurrahman Wahid (the former president of Indonesia). The wording its more or less the same but Abdurrahman Wahid was the chairman of Nahlatul Ulama, or old leader, and at that time was the president of republic and at that time he was trying to normalize diversity in politic; and the branding or the footprint of diversity the minority and the diversity, 'Bhineka Tunggal Ika' was making recording local elections and at that time Ahok was emerging as a Chinese Christian that try to run local election in his hometown and its symbolically very important for Indonesia, because we have Unity in the Diversity, we have Pancasila and then we are not supposed to discriminate anyone in the bases of religion affiliation or ethnicity and Ahok was a good trademark to signifies...

*To make a show off that the country its really...*

P: But to make a discourse that Abdurrahman want to spread out this is the evidence, maybe I have thought good obstacle to being more elegant in democracy. The Quran versus that Ahok said was coping what Abdurrahman Wahid said when Abdurrahman was visiting him in his nomination and he stated in a big crowd and the president of the republic endorsed Ahok nominations and the idea it's to simulate that Indonesia has no wrong with this thing on the purposes of religion and ethnicity and exactly the same wording was used by Ahok when he was governor of Jakarta and giving speech in Pulau Seribu devoting the same but somebody tried to twitch the logic, the logic trying to demonize him to say that it was blasphemy.

*Well, what Dr. Hakim said to me according to this is that when it was this, get viral his comments, there was some actors that want to make their fame and being famous and viral and they used these problematic things, and they just spread it.*

P: Yes, this is the play, the manipulation that we are talking about, but what I'm saying is that Indonesia was working very hard to make the philosophy of Pancasila, the non-discriminatory, human ethic, unity in diversity, whatever it is, in real sense and then, the legacy of Abdurrahman Wahid was abolished in Jakarta case, and you thing the same person.

*Maybe Abdurrahman it's more 'untouchable' than Ahok, Ahok was easier to...*

P: Exactly!

*To kill him politically*

P: Exactly! This is...

J: He is a more perfect target.

P: And manipulation was well aware, prior to the official nomination of Ahok. Ahok was nominated by PDI right? But PDI was well aware that this is going to be for his disabling; Calculated and it spread out very well, because the discursive politicize has not been advanced yet when Ahok was winning the elections, and the imaginary of everyone was still sensitive to the religious feeling that a citizenship nominating public, so this is it, what I'm saying is that he had been an easy target for politicizing religion the way... But what I want to trace is that this kind of discourse, respecting human as human being not in order of fellow of religious or ethnicity group was led by two preeminent scholars. One was Abdurrahman Wahid and secondly is Nurcholish Madjid. So, he was at that time an emergent scholar, western educated and also a devoted Muslim and instead of talking about religion they frame. (They said) Let's talk about religion and not about religious identity, and as the people was passed away, no more defender of that idea than making out religion as a weapon of political purpose easily merge. Because the prime defender of the idea was no longer alive.

*So, this take me to the next question that its: This instrumentation of the religion in politics it used normally by some kind of people that its always on the power as Megawati, SBY...*

P: They want to go to power the issue its to make out ...

J: Yeah, more people tend to play with religious issues to get political gate.

P: Every politician or everyone that know politics do that. If they do religion it's easier to go to power, but people like me, that don't have any interest to be local government official or to be elected, then we don't care, we just do religion for religion.

*Well, for this reason I'm trying to interview people here in the academical sphere because then when I'm going to try to meet the Partai, they will not say the same in the same words...*

P: No, they are this kind of guys so you had to be really well edited what you want to say or to who in order to do it

*They will say probably (referring to the Partai) that people are choosing me because people like my ideas and like my electoral program and not because I'm using something that really touch them deep inside to make them vote me.*

P: You have to make them confess, it depend on you, how to prove that your step to step asking, no way to communicate confession, this depends on you, if you are not strong in off, not cleaver in off, then they are easily this guys (referring to avoid a clear answer of my questions).

*They will just avoid to...*

P: Well this is all what political it's about, they are trained for it.

*They are trained to say the speech and they want to say and not what I want that they say.*

P: The sign is this: If they alter the normative things, this is the way to hide. One way to avoid embarrassment.

*Well, it's a good tip this one.*

P: So, talking about normative, talking about something (referring to the Partai actors) ...

J: Talking about harmony, this is the weal of the majority of the people to hide something.

*And then for me, to finish this kind of interview I will have a question that it's OK: This kind of cases make the people mobilize, and they go to demonstrations, and they make pressure to the politics, so till what point it's democratic that government follow what people ask and till what point is the government that need to be autonomous and the government need to hear this demonstrations and need to follow what the demonstrators are asking.*

P: Demonstration it's only the capo. Demonstration its only demonstrating that the idea was supported but the supporters not necessarily go to the demonstration because politician just need to have sympathy, need to have recognition, and most of the demonstrators are paid but people that want them mobilize, so at last, what people call 'Korlap' (Korlap es la abreviatura de coordinador de campo y puede interpretarse como el presidente o la persona a la que se le asigna la tarea de ser un líder en un área determinada. Generalmente utilizado por organizaciones o asociaciones con nombres de korlap para ciertos puestos).

J: Field coordinator.

*So, it's the people that take them to the bus and go.*

P: And make sure that X number of people it's in the bus at that time and bring them back to his area. So, when people are running to demonstrations, it become a secret that some people its earning money. Even the enshroud activist. Even them was asking money from the money, from the senior who are politician in the national level and run for something and then asking money to the senior to follow the mobilization process and involving money, they have to get truck to bring people; but this is basically non autonomous through weal of the demonstrators, they are not autonomously...

*Wanting to do that, in certain way it's too easy to make it, so let's do it.*

P: So, in case of election, many people are having different uniform, and depending of the way that they are going for the demonstrations, so they have three set from three different political parties. One day they use yellow, another day they use blue, and...

So, this is bubble, it's just showing off that something is happening. And this is what concern me, because if people its easily mobilize we don't have democracy. Because what we have is the contest among the elite.

*And here you have a really strong elite that has been managing politics since long time ago.*

P: Yeah, and its elite, mostly are feeling near with the religious group.

*So now you just answer question 4 with this one.*

*And well, to finish the interview I have one question that it's not written in the 'official' interview that it's my main hypothesis in the research that it's the case of Ahok; the sentence that send him to jail it's a violation of the religious freedom of the country?*

P: Yeah, it is, this is why, because of the success of instrumentation of religious politic. Then the presidential election was so crowded, because we understand that the success in making motivated religious display then we been anticipated that the president election will be peaceful fight and it happen and framing one the other to the bases of religion was happening. So, both sides are playing out religion, but they use religion in different side

J: And I was so disappointed and angry at that time, because at that time we were talking about overlooking political position, but then will all this identical politics, boom! All agenda was messed in the nothing

P: But the point is that no one, no institution doing serious political education in this time.

So, they just want the chair?

P: They only care about the mindset of the owner of democracy, they are caring about who is winning then mobilizing time to time never change. So, what we have is not electing president, this is the celebrations of elite domination and political parties are just stage...

I like that you are clear like this

P: This is what I see, for that reason, the project that we are doing in our department it's to reformulate democracy. Democracy it's about popular control, not about elected, so our numerators where going to the field and interview the elite and there was wandering (referring to the elite): Hey! You are talking about democracy? Why you don't talk about... start by the elections? The respondent was complaining because when we talk about democracy we talk about elections and this is the tramp, because we have been hypnotized about democracy as elections.

No one tell what is his political agenda it's about, what is the sign that this is identity game. People it's not well educated about this, and this is the cheek that has been repeated from election to election, and for that reason the, in our department, when we have strong control about what we need to do, then we transform the idea of human citizen and human right, because normally when we talk about citizen we say: what is citizen about? Not you are the citizen of this country, what do you do for your country?

*The rights and obligations as a citizen?*

P: No, citizenship as a knowledge about citizenship and don't make that citizenship is the order of the country, the owner of democracy, the designer of the things. When we talk about democracy we talk about subject.

J: Yeah.

P: Democracy is the literacy but not the real practice of the country and the ruler of the country it's the absence of citizenship (consciousness), and this is the element.

*(Conversation drift to other issues about what they are doing in PolGov actually).*

P: Citizenship it's about you, about your country, not about your knowledge, let's do things, no matter how big or how small but let's make democracy work because you are the owner of democracy, not the elite not the elected.

Democracy should make everybody improve they welfare.

*But for example, in Indonesia its quite hard this, as it's not a unique country; Indonesia its spread in the ocean, it's quite hard to make that Java and Papua can have the same welfare.*

P: We make it because we are a University; lets spread out the idea, like a virus, and the virus will be running alone. And because we have network, we spread the idea on the network.

And secondly, it's about local regime, because each locality has their own ways to dealing things. Papuan have different ways to make democracy works, Jogja we have king and we need to look out differently.

*So, you mean that we need to focus in each territory about how they are making their own way and not just make unitary way to understand it and do it in a more flexible way according to the regency or the territory that we are talking about.*

P: Yes, we don't need to look the elections as everything, this is just leading the elite capturing and steeling democracies. So, by seating aside the importance of the elite for a moment, let make democracy work in the real life, and because we are unity in the diversity, then the diversity of making democracy works on this way, as the idea. Because you start in the unity in the diversity, so then we have a project in local regime, so each locality has their own way. You know, when I was meeting somebody, he was from NTT (Nusa Tenggara Timur), from East Timor, and he share his local style of politics on with clan it's the important; so OK, let's go about clans, this is the real life, clan it's the soil on we put the seeds or the plants and because it is a seed you need to take the seed or you need to change the soil where this plant grows.

### **Entrevista a Kenzy Dario, estudiant d'Informàtica a la Universitat Gadjah Mada**

*The first question is: Indonesia is a country that defends and promote religious diversity (as demonstrated by the motto of the State "Bhineka tunggal ika" and Pancasila). How is the relationship between politics and religion articulated in this context?*

So, in my opinion I think there is a strong religion between politics and religion in this country, especially because the verse in the holy Quran states that you can't take someone that is not Muslim, so most of the politician are Muslim because of that. First as you might remember, back in 2017, the Jakarta governor, Ahok talk about this, and someone cut the video, and now he spends two years in jail, I don't know...

*He makes the speech at 2016, but then he was processed at 2017, after all of this and all the demonstrations in Jakarta*

Yeah, actually here the context is politics, I think because he was so clean, and you know, just doesn't accept primary stuff so, that's why someone look after the case so hard, and then he get something he doesn't deserve in my opinion, I mean when you see the video, if you are a Muslim and you say that to another Muslim... have you seen the video actually?

*Yeah*

And did you get the meaning or anything?

*So, it was just the words that Abdurrahman Wahid said to him, you know, the ex-president...*

Oh yeah, yeah, 'Gusdur'

*So, he said that words to Ahok and then Ahok*

What's 'Ahok'?

*Ahok, the governor*

Ah! Ahok I thought like... *(he was not understanding my pronunciation of the name)*

*So, he just repeats the words, but of course it's not the same that the president of Indonesia says that with all his power*

And he is also Muslim

*Yeah, and not the same to be said by a Chinese Christian minority*

I think that its maybe because he is Chinese and he is Christian, so maybe it's not Javanese

*Well, what the researchers of UGM said to me is that they tried to catch him by some way, by corruption they could not catch him, also by politics they could not catch him because he was really being technocratic, and doing all public, so the only way they could catch him it's by the target that he is a Chinese minority, so it was just the way*

Yeah, but maybe it can be that way when it comes to political, so I mean, maybe you need to do some dirty stuff when you arrive to politician, but back to the point, the relation between politics and religion its very... I might say, strong here, especially in Java, not in Bali, because in Bali there is many Hindu, maybe in some island that most of the population is Muslim, like for instance Aceh

*Yeah, but it's also in Java it's the centre of the country politics, what happens in Java will happen in the rest of the country.*

*So, it just takes me to the next question: In the same way, since the period of “Reformasi” do you think that this relationship has been leading to a politization of religion?*

First of all I would like to say that I’m not at all into politics, like in my whole life, I don’t really care so much about politics, because first of all I’m Chinese Indonesian, Buddhist, and also I don’t have any connection to the politician stuff, so I’m not interested to becoming one. So, I don’t really know the relation between politics and religion, but the ‘reformasi’, after Suharto fall, I was just already born, I mean, I was born at December of 1999.

*And Suharto fall at 1998*

I was born at late 99, so even I don’t even know who is him, until I was ten or something, and even until now I don’t really know... well, yeah, I mean he is bad, but I don’t even know the specific things that he do to the people.

*Well, in the case that I’m talking about, he makes a really hard line between politics and religion*

Oh, so it’s good?

*In this case depend of how you look at it can be good. He makes a line like, here is Golkar, and Muslim organizations as Muhamadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, all of them do all your stuff but just in education, on your own ways, but don’t try to enter in politics because it’s my line.*

You know FPI (Front Pembela Islam), a Muslim defender or something, a community organization, so there is a lot of social organizations

*So, its civil society? It’s not directly involved in Partai?*

I think, I don’t really know if they are really engaged in politic stuff, it seems like they do because when Ahok case come in, they are really like in the front line. You know Habib Rizieq, he is the leader of Front Pembela Islam, so this organization its majority Muslim (...) when Ahok case come up, this organization really come up in the front line and really do radical stuff like destroying things. This is the bad picture of Muslim in my opinion, but the organization is very strong in low society class, because you can give to them some money and they will support you in any way they can, maybe the social organization, ‘Ormas Organisasi’, it’s the largest and maybe the most effective, and maybe it’s because them.

(Conversation go to other directions...)

Maybe somehow, they are inside the politics or something

*Well, so by your point of view there has been a politization of the religion*

Yes, maybe

*So, this take us to the third question: Does you consider that the sentence of 2 years of prison for blasphemy to Ahok has a relation with this possible politicization of the religious sphere with a political use of the Religious Courts?*

Yes, of course, there is a lot of theories, and actually people have been thinking that this is only for political use, I mean when you... remember when in 2017, I go to Jakarta to vote, you remember there was 3...

*3 candidates you mean? The son of SBY, etc.*

The son of SBY just get like 19% of votes, a little one, the smallest one. The second was Ahok, so in the first round he actually won, but only by a 14% or something, and the third one is Anies Baswedan with Sandiaga Uno, so actually you know that Anies it's a former education minister here?

*Really?*

Back in Jokowi first period, but he got some ... He is former student from UGM

*Really?*

And Jokowi too, so you can thing that UGM created Jokowi or Anies too, so back to Anies, in the first round, Ahok win, but according to the rule you need to be like 66% no?

*So, the son of SBY just disappear and he give support to Anies*

Now I'm not sure to he really supports, but you can see that the supporters of SBY son goes off to Anies and this is because the first campaigning, you know the verse of Quran, Al'Maida 51, so someone stays agree to them and someone not, actually I don't know witch one is witch (reference to son of SBY and Anies), so the supporter came from SBY to Anies because of that, so religion cause to someone to change their political view, I mean, as long as they don't choose non-Muslims

*So, you just asked question number 5 now*

But think that there is a lot of conspiracy theories, I mean, back in 2017, if Ahok win, I might say that Jokowi would lose in 2019, but since Ahok lose and Anies win and see how he works as shit (reference to Anies) they would choose Jokowi, there are some theories that say that...

*Yeah well there are some theories that say that Jokowi didn't say anything to support Ahok, that in certain way is from the same Partai, but they didn't say absolutely anything because he didn't want that his image gets destroyed for the next elections that he was running for*

Yeah, and actually, Ahok has been free from jail, like 6 months

*Yes, since February*



So, what makes him change because after he get out of prison, he didn't involve more in politics

*Yeah well, when you send someone to prison, you kill him politically, of course he can run again to politics, but after all this problematics, it was not good for anyone, for him after all this shit, and for the society, because someone that has been into jail, for something that he has done or not it's not so much ethical that he run again*

I mean, that and the fact that he divorces... I'm not sure why

(Here the conversation moves to other issues out of the project)

Well, maybe Anies it's what Jakarta deserves

*Well, it's what the voted for, they chose it. So, let's go to question number 4: There are a whole set of public figures that are immersed at politics in positions of great power since long time ago (such as SBY, Megawati, Prabowo, the children of Suharto, etc.). Do you think that these elites use religion as a way to remain at power and that their "Partai" and civil society in general continue giving to them their support?*

I mean, maybe the first of unspoken rules in Indonesia, when it comes to becoming a politician or someone in great power, I mean, in the State, not in a company of course, like you have to be Muslim, it's the first unspoken and unwritten rule, especially since the Ahok case, so everyone now know that there is a verse literally in the Quran that states that, not really literally, because they don't say leaders, they just say 'good friend', in the verse so it seems that since this case, a lot of people had been upset, but politics, this people, SBY and then Prabowo, I don't think you can include children of Suharto, because they only take their fathers... but they also are the leaders of their parties, so...

*Well, actors like Megawati were born on politics*

They were born on politic blood or something like that, but I think religion is not one of... I mean, they born in this way, so they can use it like, they don't intentionally used, they just borne Muslim, they don't explode that, I think in my opinion

*So, by your point of view you consider that Ahok sentence was a vulnerating of the religious freedom?*

Not in that way. The country only states that you are free to be on any religion. It doesn't say that you have to be on this religion to live, it's a society rules so not in that way. It doesn't follow any infringement of religious freedom, but in the way if you think about it does, so...

*So that's all the formal interview.*